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Abstract 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the regulatory and economic issues raised by the recent 
gain in prominence of the so-called “Sovereign Wealth Funds” (SWFs), by first trying to better identify 
the actual legal and economic nature of such “special purpose” government investment vehicles. SWFs 
are generally deemed to bring significant benefits to global capital markets. Nevertheless, significant 
concerns have been expressed due to SWFs limited disclosure and transparency, their multiple 
investment objectives and notably as – being sovereign entities’ instruments – SWFs may take 
investment decisions driven by political and/or strategic objectives and considerations or in a fashion 
entailing national security concerns. Although the debate on SWFs has mostly revolved around such 
issues, this paper aims at also pointing out that SWFs sharp growth is one of the by-products of the large 
and persistent global imbalances in trade (which may threat global financial and economic stability) and 
that the increasing transfer of “excess reserves” from monetary authorities to SWFs is expected to result 
in significant rebalancing of capital flows in global financial markets. On the other side, while the risk of 
a political/strategic bias should not be underestimated, this paper argues that at present a specific 
regulation of SWFs may not be needed, as their assets actual management is already constrained by 
SWFs own features and objectives as well as by many regulatory, economic and political factors (e.g. 
WTO and OECD rules, as well as the acquis communautaire already provide for legal waivers and 
exception to the free movement of capital and goods whereby “legitimate national interests” are at stake). 
With specific reference to legal aspects, this paper proposes that a balanced and proportionate regulatory 
approach to SWFs issues may just require, for the time being, to complement “soft law” instruments – 
e.g. the so-called “Santiago Principles” or GAPP and the OECD guidelines for SWFs investments 
(expected to be finalised in 2009) – with a “light” and “indirect” regulatory and supervisory framework 
for SWFs equity investments consistent, inter alia, with the recommendations endorsed in the European 
Parliament Resolution of 23 September 2008 on transparency of institutional investors and essentially 
based on legal principles and provisions already in force in most EU Member States. In particular, 
reference could be made, primarily, to principles and rules providing for shareholding notification 
requirements and disclosure of information on voting rights attached to shares, and whereby necessary to 
those imposing possible limits to shareholdings and/or to the exercise of voting rights by EU companies’ 
shareholders. 
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  21. Introduction to the Sovereign Wealth Funds phenomenon 
 
Despite the relatively recent interest in the political, legal and financial 
issues posed by the increasing prominence of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
phenomenon, SWFs are actually not new players in the global economy and 
financial markets; indeed they have been around for more than 25 years, mainly 
and traditionally established by countries rich in natural resources (e.g. oil). 
According to available data, more than half of the largest SWFs were 
established before the year 2000 (SWFs first generation), but it is since the year 
2000 that the “SWF phenomenon” has gained new momentum, leading to an 
increase in both size and number of SWFs (Picture 1 and Chart 1). 
The rapid changes recently occurred in SWFs characteristics (both at 
individual and aggregate level) and in the economic environment in which they 
operate make them emerge as among the most important players in global 
financial markets, thus attracting substantial attention by policy makers, market 
participants and the international community.  
In particular, SWFs rapid development mainly reflects the significant shift 
of emerging economies from world’s debtors to world’s creditors. Indeed for 
nearly all the second half of the twentieth century, emerging economies ran 
current account deficits and imported foreign capital; nevertheless, as pointed out, 
“in 1999, the emerging world as a whole began to run a current account surplus 
and export capital to the rest of the world”
1. 
That surplus rapidly increased, reaching an estimated 685 billion USD in 
2006 (1.3% of world GDP), the “Asian economies are the exemplars of the trend. 
But it is not just Asia, as oil exporters and developing countries in Latin America 
have also racked up increasing surpluses. The exceptions are the emerging Eastern 
European economies, Turkey, South Africa, and India – countries that still have 
significant current account deficits”
2. 
As a result, developed countries as a group started to run progressively 
larger current account deficit. Moreover, the scale of differences also grew “with 
more countries running surpluses or deficit of over 5% of GDP”
3. 
Emerging countries also started accumulating foreign assets. When the 
level of such assets outstripped the level of reserves needed for stabilisation 
purposes, it became reasonable to try to increase returns on reserves by 
                                                 
1 Toloui R., (2007), When Capital Flows Uphill: Emerging Markets as Creditors, PIMCO, Capital 
Perspective, June 2007. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Bank of England, Sovereign wealth funds and global imbalances, Quarterly Bulletin, 2008 Q2, p. 197. 
  3diversifying investments from traditional government debt securities, also through 
establishment of SWFs (FX reserves held by emerging countries’ central banks as 
a whole are estimated to be approx. 60% – nearly 3 trillion USD – higher than 
what actually needed to cover short-term external debt
4).  
 
2. Possible definitions of SWFs: what, exactly, is a SWF?  
 
Although it proves to be a key question, unfortunately there is no common, 
generally accepted or off-the-shelf definition of what a SWF actually is. Indeed 
numerous definitions have been proposed. 
For instance, the US Under Secretary for International Affairs (Clay 
Lowery) referred to a SWF as
5: i) a government investment vehicle; ii) which is 
funded by foreign exchange assets and; iii) which manages those assets separately 
from official reserves.  
In the view of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), SWFs can 
generally be defined as
6: i) special investment funds; ii) created or owned by 
governments; iii) to hold foreign assets for long-term purposes. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD - November 2007) SWFs are essentially: i) government-
owned investment vehicles; ii) funded by foreign exchange assets. 
All the definitions reported above focus their attention either on how 
SWFs are funded (by foreign exchange assets), the type of assets they hold 
(foreign assets) or how SWFs assets are managed (separately from sponsor 
countries’ official reserves).  
As they "capture" just some SWFs "typical" features they appear to some 
extent underinclusive
7, in particular not wide enough to capture within their scope 
entities usually included in the "SWF club", such as: i) the Korea Investment 
Corporation (KIC) and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) (i.e. they do 
not fully manage official reserve separately from other portfolios); ii) Temasek, 
Khazanah of Malaysia and SASCA of China (usually they are either not funded 
by foreign assets or their assets are invested mainly internally). 
                                                 
4 Ibidem. 
5 Remarks by Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery on Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
the International Financial System, San Francisco, June 21, 2007, hp-471. 
6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Financial Stability Report, October 2007. 
7 State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Assessing the Impact, Vision, Vol. III, Issue 2, 2008. 
  4A slightly wider definition was proposed by a recent European Central 
Bank  Occasional Paper
8, whose authors broadly define SWFs as: i) public 
investment agencies; ii) which manage part of the (foreign) assets of national 
states. 
Another fairly wide definition of SWF has been put forth by the IMF 
which, for the purpose of drafting the forthcoming 6th version of its Balance of 
Payment Manual, acknowledges (Par. 6.93 of the Draft Text) that some 
governments create: i)  "special purpose government funds", usually called 
Sovereign Wealth Funds; ii)  to hold assets of the economy for long-term 
objectives; iii) the funds to be invested commonly arise from commodity sales, 
privatisation proceeds, and/or accumulation of foreign financial assets by 
authorities. 
As long as it is not clear whether the assets held in such "special purpose 
government funds" could or should be included in a country’s reserve assets, the 
IMF is essentially willing to provide appropriate guidance to prevent the risk that 
establishment of SWFs could undermine reliability of the “soft law” instruments 
specifically developed by the very IMF to achieve (although on a merely 
voluntary basis) proper degree of transparency on the global amount, value and 
composition of official reserves
9 – namely: i) the "Currency Composition of 
Official Foreign Exchange Reserves" data base (COFER); ii) the “Data Template 
on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity”, which is part of the 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS)
10. 
According to the IMF, “a key determination is whether there is some legal 
or administrative guidance that results in the assets being encumbered in a way 
that precludes their ready availability to the monetary authorities”
11. 
                                                 
8 European Central Bank, (2008), The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets, by R. 
Beck and M. Fidora, Occasional Paper, n. 91/2008. 
9 As reported, “according to IMF staff, the countries themselves determine whether to include the value of 
their SWF assets in their reserve assets or separately as external assets. In some cases, countries do not report 
any information, about their SWF. […] Analyzing a selection of 21 countries with SWFs, IMF staff found 
that only 11 included the value of their SWFs’ assets in either their balance of payments or international 
investment position data. IMF staff noted that members are not required to report the value of the SWF 
holdings as a separate line item and no member currently does so”, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
(2008), SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS Publicly Available Data on Sizes and Investments for Some Funds 
Are Limited, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-946, 
September 2008, p. 15. 
10 In this respect the EU Commission noted that “since SWFs are managed independently from a country's 
foreign exchange reserves, they are excluded from transparency mechanisms such as the IMF maintains for 
foreign exchange reserves […]. The extension of specific transparency standards to SWFs should be 
considered. Existing IMF and OECD guidelines already contain such standards, and some SWFs, such as 
those of Norway and Singapore are governed by principles which could be seen as a reference. However, 
SWFs should not be expected to follow transparency practices going beyond those developed by the IMF and 
the OECD and already applicable to similar state-owned investors”, European Commission (2008), 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth 
Funds”, COM (2008) 115 final, 27.2.2008, par. 4.3. 
11 See par. 6.94 of the draft text of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 6
th Balance of Payment Manual. 
  5In other words, whereby the external assets of a country are held in a 
special purpose government fund and the relevant monetary authorities are legally 
entitled to exercise control over such fund, “legal” assumption exists “that the 
assets are reserve assets (provided all other criteria for being a reserve asset are 
met). On the other hand, if the funds are held in a long-term fund separately 
incorporated, the presumption is that they should not be included in reserve assets, 
not least because the ready availability criterion is less likely to be met”. 
As a result, any final determination depends upon circumstances but, as 
pointed out by the IMF, generally speaking “in the absence of legal or 
administrative impediments, and given the fungibility of assets, even assets that 
had been earmarked as part of a special purpose government fund but could be 
used to meet balance of payments financing needs and other related purposes are 
reserve assets (subject to the other criteria being met including, importantly, the 
control of the monetary authorities over the disposition of the funds)”
12. 
In other cases, “where special purpose government funds’ foreign assets 
do not meet the criteria to be classified as reserve assets, they should be classified 
in the financial account and International Investment Position
13 under the 
appropriate instrument and functional category”. 
Finally, in the opinion of the IMF, “if special purpose government funds 
own direct investment equity and debt securities that could be classified in either 
direct investment or reserves assets, as general guidance, in the hierarchy of the 
balance of payments and IIP between direct investment and reserve assets, 
o  the equity securities should be classified as direct investment ahead of 
reserve assets, and  
o  debt securities should be classified as reserve assets ahead of direct 
investment”
14. 
For comprehensiveness, the EU Commission referred to SWFs as: i) state-
owned investment vehicles; ii) which manage a diversified portfolio of domestic 
and international financial assets
15. 
Moreover, the Commission acknowledges that SFWs are typically (but not 
necessarily):  i)  funded from accumulated foreign-exchange reserves in their 
                                                 
12 Ibidem, par. 6.97.  
13 As specified, “the international investment position (IIP) is a statistical statement that shows at a point in 
time the value and composition of: (a) financial assets of residents of an economy that are claims on 
nonresidents and gold bullion held as reserve assets; and (b) liabilities of residents of an economy to 
nonresidents. The difference between an economy’s external financial assets and liabilities is the economy’s 
net IIP, which may be positive or negative”, ibidem, par. 7.1. 
14 Ibidem, par. 6.98. 
15 European Commission (2008), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A common 
European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds”, COM (2008) 115 final, 27.2.2008, par. 2.1. 
  6sponsor countries; ii) managed separately from official reserves (i.e. with higher 
risk acceptance in search of higher returns). 
Based upon the different definitions proposed, a common key feature 
distinguishing a SWF from other investment vehicles and institutional investors 
lies in its "property regime". As a result, a SWF proves to be typically: 
o  state-funded, and 
o  managed (directly or indirectly) in the interest of its sponsor country. 
That said, in order to better discriminate between SWFs and other public 
investment vehicles – e.g. to clearly define the scope of possible regulatory 
measures of SWF investments – a more "solid" definition of SWFs proves 
necessary. 
In this respect, a practical way to identify SWFs could be to define them 
by exclusion – a useful reference is the fairly comprehensive and inclusive 
definition of SWFs proposed by "State Street"
16, according to which SWFs are 
essentially: 
o  sovereign-owned asset pools,  
o  which are neither traditional public pension funds nor traditional 
reserves assets supporting national currencies. 
According to such definition, certain sovereign-owned assets are likely to 
be regarded as sovereign wealth (regardless of their other characteristics) as long 
as they
17: 
o  are managed (directly or indirectly) to pursue public interests other 
than those related to monetary/exchange rate policies and public 
pension systems/schemes, and  
o  do not represent prudential monetary reserves (i.e. they are not even 
assets maintained for prudential purposes by central banks and 
monetary authorities in excess of what they judged adequate for their 
policy purposes); 
                                                 
16 State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Assessing the Impact, Vision, Vol. III, Issue 2, pp. 3-6. 
17 For instance, regardless of “whether they are domestic or foreign, equity-like or debt-financed, earmarked 
for current or future generations, highly liquid and broadly diversified or relatively illiquid and concentrated”, 
Ibidem.
 
  7A similar approach (i.e. defining SWFs by exclusion) has been followed 
also by the International Working Group of SWFs (IWG-SWF) – comprising 26 
IMF member countries with SWFs
18 –
  for the purpose of drafting the SWFs 
“Generally Accepted Principles and Practices” (GAPP) or “Santiago Principles”, a 
voluntary set of principles and practices that IWG members support and either 
have implemented or aspire to implement in order to “identify a framework of 
generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate 
governance and accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment 
practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis”. As specified by the IWG-SWF, 
GAPP also “aims at supporting the institutional framework, governance, and 
investment operations of SWFs […]. Publication of the GAPP should help 
improve understanding of SWFs as economically and financially oriented entities 
in both the home and recipient countries. This understanding aims to contribute to 
the stability of the global financial system, reduce protectionist pressures, and 
help maintain an open and stable investment climate”
19. 
Within GAPP meaning, SWFs are defined as “special purpose investment 
funds or arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the general 
government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer 
assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies 
which include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly 
established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency 
operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts 
resulting from commodity exports”
20. 
Accordingly, the following entities would be, in principle, excluded from 
the SWF definition proposed by the IWG: i) foreign currency reserves held by 
Monetary Authorities for traditional Balance of Payments/Monetary Policy 
purposes and needs; ii) operations of traditional State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
in the traditional sense; iii)  national pension funds with contractual liabilities 
disallowing their use for general macroeconomic purposes; iv) assets managed for 
the benefit of individuals; v)  government lending funds (i.e. mainly domestic 
funds); vi) government owned banks (e.g. national development banks) operating 
as intermediaries rather than for general economic purposes. 
In other words, on top of being state-owned – certainly a peculiar but not 
exclusive feature of SWFs – SWFs assets are: 
o  operationally and legally ring-fenced from other state's assets and 
source of wealth (primarily official reserve), 
                                                 
18 Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Ireland, Korea, 
Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, 
the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Permanent observers of the IWG are: Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Vietnam, OECD, and the World Bank. 
19  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds, Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices. “Santiago Principles”, October 2008, p. 4. 
20 Ibidem, p. 27. 
  8o  in order to serve public objectives and interests, defined by political 
bodies, other than those directly related to the conduct of monetary and 
exchange rate policies (therefore they are not part of 
monetary/exchange policies instruments), 
o  against  liabilities just broadly defined (SWFs may include reserve 
assets, but not all reserve assets are to be regarded as SWFs).  
It implies that SWFs assets are inter alia subject to legal or administrative 
provisions that preclude sponsor countries’ Monetary Authorities from being 
clearly entitled to legally exercise a right to call upon them to pursue their own 
typical functions (e.g. related to balance of payments needs). As a result, SWFs 
assets are usually not as highly liquid and promptly marketable as official 
reserves. 
Furthermore, a distinguishing element of SWFs is that (as stressed in the 
mentioned ECB Occasional Paper) "they have no or only very limited liabilities" 
(or liabilities with a long maturity) allowing for (or at least favouring) pursuit of 
heterogeneous macroeconomic objectives also through: 
o  a wide range of investment strategies with a medium- to long-term 
timescale, 
o  higher risk taking behaviour,  
o  foreign investments. 
Such characteristic significantly differentiates SWFs from 
Sovereign/National Pension Funds (and SOEs), which instead have defined or 
contingent explicit liabilities, implying continuous or regular stream of payments. 
For instance, having SWFs typically “no immediate, well-defined payables, 
[…would make, inter alia,…] the consequences of a decline in the valuation of 
their assets in case of a market downturn less severe than in the case of most other 
institutional investors”
21. 
To conclude, consistently with all the above definitions, a SWF could be 
regarded as: 
o  a public owned pool of (domestic and foreign) assets; 
o  legally, financially and operationally ring-fenced  from other public 
assets and liabilities; 
o  made available to political bodies (i.e. not the Monetary Authorities) to 
achieve a variety of public objectives (typically to “insulate the budget 
                                                 
21 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, p. 13. 
  9and the economy from excess volatility in revenues, help monetary 
authorities sterilize unwanted liquidity, build up savings for future 
generations, or use the money for economic and social 
development”
22); 
o  other than those directly related to the conduct of monetary and 
exchange rate policies and management of public pension schemes. 
In this respect, effective ring-fencing regime can be achieved through 
"Physical Separation", "Organisational Separation" and "Behavioural Separation" 
measures, such as: i) requirements for separate legal entities or separate ownership 
structures (which may impose unnecessary costs and reduce operating efficiency 
though); ii) financial and accounting ring-fencing arrangements; iii) a system of 




3.  SWFs legal nature and forms between "investment funds" and 
"investment firms" 
 
With reference to the actual legal nature and form of SWFs, it is worth 
noting that, according to the generally accepted definitions used for Balance of 
Payment purposes and under the EU financial regulation provisions, a SWF may 
not necessarily be regarded as a "fund" or better an "investment fund". 
Indeed, as also pointed out by the IMF, "investment funds are collective 
investment schemes that raise funds by issuing shares or units to the public […]. 
Investment funds may be constituted: (i) under the law of contract (as common 
funds managed by management companies), or (ii) under trust law (as unit trusts), 
or (iii) under a statute (as investment companies), or (iv) otherwise with similar 
effect"
23. 
As a result, “special purpose government funds, usually called sovereign 
wealth funds, are more likely to be classified as captive financial institutions than 
as investment funds, given the nature of their liabilities, if classified as a financial 
corporation”
24.  
                                                 
22 Razanov A., (2005), Who holds the wealth of nations, Central Banking Journal, Vol. XV, No. 4, 2005. 
23 See par. 4.69-4.69 of the draft text of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 6th Balance of Payment 
Manual.  
24 Ibidem, par. 4.70.  
  10For the same reasons, under the acquis communautaire a SWF is not to be 
regarded in principle as subject to legal provisions regulating "undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities" (UCITS)
25. It rather appears to be 
more similar to one (third country) "Investment Firm" (see Art. 4 - MIFID 
Directive) performing, in the exclusive interest of its sponsor state, one or more 
investment services and activities, in particular: portfolio management. 
  Indeed under MiFID, "Investment Firm" stands for any legal person whose 
regular occupation or business is the provision of one or more of the following 
investment services to third parties and/or the performance of one or more of the 
following  investment activities on a professional basis: (1) Reception and 
transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments; (2) 
Execution of orders on behalf of clients; (3) Dealing on own account; (4) Portfolio 
Management; (5) Investment Advice; (6) Underwriting of financial instruments 
and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis; (7) Placing of 
financial instruments without a firm commitment basis. 
  In line with such considerations, it has been pointed out that “the 
information available on the world’s largest SWFs suggests that, with respect to 
investment style, these differ substantially from traditional foreign exchange 
reserves and are instead comparable to private asset managers”
26. 
In this respect, the first-ever survey of “SWFs institutional and operational 
practices” (undertaken as a voluntary exercise by 20 members of the International 
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF) as background 
information and input in the preparation of a set of “Generally Accepted Practices 
and Principles” (GAPP), revealed that: “the legal basis and form in which SWFs 
are established vary from country to country”,  nevertheless 50% of the 
respondents (most respondents have SWFs funded out of mineral royalties, 
mainly oil) “indicate that they are established as legal entities separate from the 
state or the central bank, whereas the rest are not separate legal entities (pool of 
assets). SWFs falling under the former category either have a legal personality 
established under a specific constitutive law, or are a private corporation 
established under company law. SWFs falling within the latter category are 
usually controlled by the Ministry of Finance and operationally managed by the 
central bank or a statutory management agency. While many of these SWFs are 
also established by specific constitutive laws, some are established by general 
                                                 
25 Defined as "undertakings the sole object of which is the collective investment in transferable securities of 
capital raised from the public and which operate on the principle of risk-spreading, and the units of which are, 
at the request of holders, re-purchased or redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of those undertakings' assets", 
see art.1 of Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS). 
26 European Central Bank, (2008), The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets, by 
Beck R. and Fidora M., Occasional Paper, n. 91/2008, p. 12. 
  11fiscal (budget or fiscal responsibility) laws, and one is established under the 
central bank law”
27 (Chart 2). 
As suggested above, a practical method to identify SWFs is by exclusion: 
SWFs are Sovereign Wealth Management Arrangement other than Central Banks, 
Monetary Authorities, SOEs and National Pension Funds (the latter are, inter alia, 
not directly financed by foreign exchange assets generated by commodity 
exports). 
Having said that, it is easy to observe that SWF is an acronym covering a 
heterogeneous range of governments' special purpose investment arrangements, as 
not all of SWFs are equally established or managed, they actually lie along a 
spectrum of different sovereign investment institutions/arrangements delimited by 
Central Banks/Monetary Authorities, on one end, and State-Owned Enterprises, 
on the other end (Chart 3). 
Along this spectrum, SWFs “differ in size, age, structure, funding sources, 
governance, policy objectives, risk return profiles, investment horizons, eligible 
assets classes and instruments”
28. 
In the aim to better sort out and rearrange such variety, SWFs could be 
usefully grouped by source of wealth and policy objectives (i.e. wealth intended 
use).  
In this respect, a main preliminary distinction could be drawn between: 
o  Commodity Funds (e.g. Norway Government Pension Funds and 
Middle Eastern SWFs) essentially financed by sale of commodities 
(i.e. oil). They represent net national savings by their sponsor 
governments and are usually established for budget stabilisation and 
wealth sharing across generations; 
o  Non Commodity Funds (typically established by Asian countries – e.g. 
GIC, KIC, HKMA Exchange Fund) funded via transfer of (excess) 
assets from national foreign exchange reserves portfolios  held and 
managed by national Central Banks or Monetary Authorities. 
With reference to their objectives and investment policies, according to 
IMF taxonomy, SWFs can be broadly grouped in the following categories: 
o  Stabilisation Funds: set up by countries rich in natural resources to 
insulate the budget and economy from volatile commodity prices 
(usually oil). Funds build up assets over the years of ample fiscal 
revenues in order to prepare for leaner years. 
                                                 
27 IWG, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Current Institutional and Operational Practices, Prepared by the IWG 
Secretariat in Collaboration with the Members of the IWG, September 15, 2008. 
28 State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Assessing the Impact, Vision, Vol. III, Issue 2, p. 15. 
  12While newer oil funds predominantly focus on stabilisation objectives, 
the recent increase in oil prices has allowed them a more flexible 
management of their assets, adding further emphasis to savings 
objectives. 
o  Savings Funds: mainly intended to share wealth across generations by 
transferring non-renewable assets into a diversified portfolio of 
(international) financial assets, to provide for future generations
29 or 
other long-term objectives (e.g. to prevent/mitigate the so-called 
"Dutch disease", namely a syndrome likely to occur where a large 
inflow of foreign currency – e.g. due to a sharp surge in prices of 
commodities exported, foreign assistance and foreign direct investment 
– is converted into local currency and spent on domestic non-traded 
goods, inducing a real exchange rate appreciation that weakens the 
competitiveness of the country's exports (spending effect), and a shift 
of capital and labour into sectors experiencing an increase in domestic 
demand (resource movement effect)
30; 
o  Reserve Investment Corporations: vehicles established as a separate 
legal entity either to reduce the negative cost-of-carry of holding 
reserves or to pursue investment policies with higher returns. Often, 
the assets in such arrangements are still counted as reserves; 
o  Development Funds: allocating resources for funding socio-economic 
projects (e.g. infrastructure); 
o  Pension Reserve Funds: having identified pension and/or contingent-
type unspecified liabilities on government’s balance sheet. 
Another, partially overlapping, useful frame of reference in the analysis of 
SWFs nature and structure is provided by the “liability approach” to SWFs 
proposed by State Street, as different structures in the liability side of SWFs 
balance sheet result in different restrictions and constraints on SWFs assets 
management (i.e. on their investment policies and decisions). 
                                                 
29 As noted, especially in Asian economies and oil-exporting countries, “there is a growing sense that turning 
“resources in the ground” into financial assets is an important channel for transferring wealth across 
generations”, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries, World 
Economic Outlook, October 2008, p. 204.  
30 The expression “Dutch disease” broadly refers to the harmful consequences for the Netherlands’ economy 
of the vast increase in its wealth experienced after discovering, in 1960, of large natural gas deposits in the 
North Sea. Unexpectedly, this positive development had serious repercussions on important segments of the 
country’s economy, as the Dutch guilder became stronger, making (inter alia) Dutch non-oil exports less 
competitive, see: Corden W. M. and Neary J. P., (1982), Booming Sector and De-Industrialization in a Small 
Open Economy, The Economic Journal, 92, December, 1982; Ebrahim-Zadeh C., (2003), Back to Basics, 
Dutch Disease: Too much wealth managed unwisely, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Finance & 
Development, March 2003, Vol. 40, No 1. 
  13  Under the proposed approach, the following types of SWFs could be 
identified
31:  
o  Contingent Liability Funds: primarily set up for macroeconomic 
stabilisation purposes by countries whose budgets are highly 
dependent on natural resources, “to smooth out budget revenues and 
expenditures; sterilize excess liquidity, protect economy from 
overheating, “Dutch disease” and boom-bust cycle”. 
Pure “Stabilization Funds” are generally considered “a class of their 
own and stand out compared to" other SWFs (e.g. savings or heritage 
funds), as their investment objectives are not very different from 
central banks reserves’ (i.e. safety and liquidity). Indeed, their 
liabilities being erratic, their primary objective is risk management and 
not long-term return and/or wealth maximisation, as all other SWFs
32. 
However, the distinction between “pure stabilisation funds” and other 
SWFs is not always clear and, in practice, most funds have mixed 
nature/objectives
33.  
o  Fixed liability funds: established to meet a fixed future (long-term) 
sovereign liability mainly represented by the projected shortfall in 
public pension systems. As a result, such funds are similar to a large 
pension scheme with very few current retirees, implying high 
flexibility in managing their assets although more constrained as they 
mature (e.g. French pension reserve, Ireland's National Pension 
Reserve Fund, Australian Future Funds and New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund); 
o  Mixed Liability Funds: having a fixed obligation to make regular 
payments into the sponsor country’s budget (according to a 
fiscal/spending rule) but, at the same time, without targeted terminal 
value. They have a relatively high degree of freedom on the asset side, 
lower than a newly lunched fixed liability fund but higher that a 
mature one (e.g. future generation fund, as in Norway and Russia); 
o  Open-Ended Liability Funds: essentially "investment 
authorities/corporations" not having explicit or contractual defined 
obligations against third parties. Accordingly, they can have longest 
investment horizon, greatest risk taking attitude and broadest assets 
diversification. 
                                                 
31 State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Assessing the Impact, Vision, Vol. III, Issue 2, 2008. 
32 Razanov A., (2007), Sovereign Wealth Funds: Defining Liabilities, State Street Global Advisors; European 
Central Bank, (2007), Financial Stability Review, December, 2007. 
33 Truman E. M., (2007), Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief, 2007. 
  14Furthermore it is worth noting that – as with private investors – liability 
profiles are not static, they may change over time mainly according to fund 
growth dynamic, shifting funds' risk/return profile and asset allocation. 
Stabilisation funds typically evolve towards savings and future generation funds.  
In this respect the policy guideline, aiming to impose SWFs “to clearly 
define and publicly disclose their policy and investment purpose”, does not appear 
particularly effective in terms of transparency. Indeed, as reported, “Norway’s 
fund may have proclaimed that it has a "100-year investment horizon", but it has 




4. Who are SWFs and how big are they? 
 
Retrieving reliable figures on SWFs size and characteristics is not easy as 
the level of disclosure and transparency differs significantly across SWFs, and 
transparency varies even within funds established by the same state (e.g. GIC and 
Temasek). 
The lack of periodic and reliable information (with the significant 
exception of Norway Government Pension Funds, widely considered the “gold 
standard” in this respect) is a main source of concerns; indeed it hampers proper 
assessment of SWFs developments and identification of potential sources of risks.  
Nevertheless, based upon various sources, Table 1 and Chart 4 in the 
Appendix provide a list of the largest SWFs and illustrate how big they are versus 
related sponsor countries’ GDP (as data are likely not to fully reflect the effects of 
the global financial crisis and economic downturn, figures may turn out to be 
overstated in the current market and economic context). 
As shown, there has been a sharp increase in the estimated SWFs AUM 
since 2000, mainly driven “by continuing high incomes from commodity sales 
and reserve accumulation for existing funds as well as the establishment of new 
entities”
35.  
                                                 
34 State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Assessing the Impact, Vision, Vol. III, Issue 2, 2008. 
35 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, p. 2. 
  15As a result, main SWFs are generally deemed to have accumulated 3.0-3.5 
trillion USD of AUM
36.  
According to the above figures, the top 9 SWFs manage more that 100 
billion USD each and account for 81% of the total AUM by SWFs taken into 
consideration. ADIA (the largest SWF) holds more than a quarter of the total. 
Such high concentration in SWFs AUM, especially if compared to other 
institutional investors (e.g. private asset managers), implies (inter alia) that “the 
largest sovereign wealth funds could have an impact on some markets especially 
smaller ones such as other EMEs”
37. 
So as to contextualise such figures, it is worth considering that the AUM 
of main SWFs almost doubled the AUM of the global Hedge Funds Industry 
(collectively, assets managed by SWFs roughly equal the value of Hedge Funds 
and Private Equity funds assets). When comparing AUM of SWFs and AUM of 
other private asset managers (e.g. Hedge Funds) it must be taken into account that 
SWFs are typically not leveraged (Chart 5). 
The assets estimated to be under the management of main SWFs roughly 
account for 14% of Investment Funds AUM, 7% of Pension Funds AUM, 50% of 
global official reserves and 2% of the total size of equity and bond markets 
globally. 
Apart from their actual size, SWFs AUM are expected to grow further and, 
according to recent IMF projections, “to surpass the stock of global foreign 
exchange reserves in the not-so-distant future and to top $7 to $11 trillion by 
2013. Thus it is clear that SWFs will play an increasingly prominent role in global 
finance”
38. According to other projections, "SWFs could potentially grow to 
US$17.5 trillion in the next 10 years, compared to a figure of around US$10 
trillion for official reserves. During this time, total global financial assets could 
roughly double. By about 2020, the share of SWFs in global wealth is almost four 
times higher, growing from around 2.5% of global financial assets to over 9%"
39.  
Charts 6 and 7 in the Appendix illustrate the relative size of overall 
SWFs AUM compared to other institutional investors and asset classes as well as 
the relative size of the largest SWFs compared to other large global investors. 
                                                 
36 As reported by the U.S. GAO “by analyzing the information reported by individual SWFs, IMF data, and 
private researchers’ estimates, we found the total assets held by the 48 SWFs we identified are estimated to be 
from $2.7 trillion to $3.2 trillion […].Many of these estimates were published in the last year prior to the 
significant rise in oil prices in the first half of 2008”, U.S. Government Accountability Office, (2008), 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS Publicly Available Data on Sizes and Investments for Some Funds Are 
Limited, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-946, 
September 2008, p. 18.  
37 Bank of England, Sovereign wealth funds and global imbalances, Quarterly Bulletin, 2008 Q2, p. 199. 
38 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries, World Economic 
Outlook, October 2008, p. 204. 
39 Morgan Stanley, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Bond and Equity Prices, June 01, 2007. 
  16With specific reference to the expectation that the overall size of SWFs 
AUM could exceed the size of global FX reserves within a few years, recent 
projection (taking into account the adverse impact on SWFs exerted by global 
financial crisis and fall in equity and oil prices) revised down the expected growth 
rate of SWFs AUM. As a result “this ‘cross-over’ date may be delayed by three 
years and that, by 2015, instead of US$11.9 trillion, total AUM of SWFs of 
US$9.7 trillion now looks like a more realistic target”
40.  
Nevertheless, available data indicate that some SWFs are already bigger 
than the FX Reserves in the relative sponsor country, somehow confirming that 
SWFs have complemented, or even replaced, the “traditional” accumulation and 
management policies of FX Reserves, as these institutions aim at better 
diversifying risks and generating higher returns than traditional official reserves, 
typically invested in low-yielding government securities. 
 
On the other hand, Chart 8 in the Appendix clearly shows that with 
reference to China and Russia, even if the respective SWFs were subject to a strict 
statutory transparency and disclosure regime or other regulatory measures, such 
measures could however capture within their scope only a small amount of the 
wealth and "monetary power" of the same countries.  
Such statement of fact raises another relevant issue: even assuming a 
commonly generally accepted definition of which specific investment vehicles 
should be regarded as SWFs existed, who would then decide when a government 
investment vehicle is to be actually considered a SWF and thus abide by certain 
rules or disclosure regime?  
For instance, it could be disputed whether the Chinese State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is to be regarded as a SWF or not. In 
other words, the key issue here is that sovereign states always retain the power to 
modify their internal legal framework and legal arrangement in order to 
move/modify boundaries between their public bodies and organisations and 
private entities, and/or between SWFs (however defined) and other investment 
vehicles – e.g. in order to opt in or out possible statutory or self-regulatory regime 
devised for SWFs.  
At the end of the day, devising a sound legal definition of SWFs may not 
be sufficient to avoid possible strategic behaviour or regulatory arbitrage by 
sovereign investment vehicles. Thus it would also be necessary to identify a 
subject, independent from SWFs sponsor countries and other stakeholders, 
entitled to decide whether or not a government investment vehicle is to be treated 
as a SWF. 
                                                 
40 Jen S. and Andreopoulos S., (2008), SWFs: Growth Tempered – US$10 Trillion by 2015, Morgan Stanley, 
Global Economic Forum, November 10, 2008. 
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5. What lies behind SWFs rapid growth? 
 
The (partial and vague) data available indicate that in recent years SWFs 
have exponentially grown in size, number and prominence (assets estimated to be 
under the management of principal SWFs increased 18% in 2007 and 14% in 
2008). Consequently the total value of assets managed (directly or indirectly) by 
SWFs is to be considered "already large enough to be systemically important, and 





The main triggers of SWFs sudden and rapid growth can be essentially 
identified in: 
o  the exceptional and rapid increase in oil price (which results in high 
revenues to oil exporters – e.g. Middle Eastern Countries, Russia, and 
Norway); 
o  the large balance of payment surpluses posted by several emerging 
economies (mainly by Asian exporting countries) and the relative 
unparalleled sustained accumulation of FX Reserves by the same 
countries (esteemed in the range of 3.1 trillion USD by end 2006)
43. 
According to certain estimates, the increase in FX Reserves was 
particularly sharp in China, deemed to hold more than 1 trillion USD 
of foreign assets
44 (Table 2 and Chart 9). 
Such accumulation of FX Reserves was fostered (inter alia) by the 
significant balance of payment deficit run by Western Countries (not only the US 
but also Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal) and in certain cases also by the exchange rate management policies 
adopted by some Asian countries (firstly China) in order to preserve their exports’ 
                                                 
41 Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Dohner before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, February 7, 2008 (HP-873). 
42 In this respect, as reported, “IMF officials have stated that collecting additional data on SWFs is important 
because of the fiscal, monetary, and economic policy impacts that the funds could have for IMF member 
countries and for the global economy, given their increasing prevalence and growth”, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, (2008), SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS Publicly Available Data on Sizes and 
Investments for Some Funds Are Limited, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
U.S. Senate, GAO-08-946, September 2008, p. 16. 
43 Mohanty M. S. and Turner P., (2006), Foreign exchange reserve accumulation in emerging markets: what 
are the domestic implications?, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2006, pp. 39-52; European Central Bank, 
Annual Report, 2007, p. 178; McKinsey Global Institute, (2007), The New Power Brokers: How Oil, Asia, 
Hedge Funds, and Private Equity Are Shaping Global Capital Markets, October 2007. 
44 European Central Bank, Annual Report, 2007, p. 17. 
  18competitiveness, all compounded with integration and liberalisation of 
international flow of capital. 
In such a scenario, the sustained growth of SWFs size and number is likely 
to continue over the coming years due to the expected trend in their typical source 
of funding – i.e. excess reserves accumulated from balance of payment surpluses 
and fiscal surpluses from the export of natural resources (primarily oil and gas). 
Indeed, as reported: i) official reserves have exhibited an “annual average 
growth rates of 11% over the past 20 years, 15% over the past ten years and even 
22% in the last five years” and “there are no material indicators that strong growth 
of official reserves will not continue to prevail in the short and medium term”; ii) 
current account surpluses in China, Russia, emerging Asian economies and OPEC 
countries “can be expected to rise further; iii) although possibly influenced by 
short term factors, oil and gas prices can be expected to remain high due to the 
steady rise in their consumption”
45. 
The general market consensus is that the sustained growth in SWFs size 
and number is likely to continue over the coming years, as estimates of the SWFs 
growth rate in the next five years vary, ranging from 5% to 35% (Chart 10). 
However, due to the adverse impact of the recent global financial and economic 
crisis and the fall in global equities, commodities prices and export growth rates 
(which may result, inter alia, in slower accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
in Asian countries) estimates for SWFs growth rate were scaled back from 
previous forecasts even as recently as mid-2008. With an estimated 3.0-3.5 trillion 
USD AUM at present, according to the U.S. GAO “SWFs are predicted to 
continue to grow significantly, to between $5 trillion and $13.4 trillion by 
2017”
46, while the IMF expects collective assets at SWFs disposal to grow to 7-11 
trillion USD by 2013
47. According to other recent estimates, although the “18% 
average annual growth seen over the past three years is likely to slow somewhat in 
the next few years […] projections are that SWFs are likely to double from their 
[…$3.9 trillion…] current level to around $8 trillion in 2015”
48. 
Of course, actual SWFs growth rate will be significantly influenced by 
several economic factors, such as: trend of oil and other commodities prices; 
economic growth posted by Asian countries and other emerging/transitioning 
economies; persistence in trade imbalances; international exchange rate policies; 
                                                 
45 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, p. 5. In particular the author reported that “by end-2007, global central bank reserves had risen 27% on 
the previous year, driven by reserves in Asia (31%), the Middle East (35%), and Latin America (47%). 
Reserves in the industrialised world, by comparison, grew by a mere 8% in that period”. 
46  U.S. Government Accountability Office, (2008), SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS Publicly Available 
Data on Sizes and Investments for Some Funds Are Limited, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-946, September 2008, p. 25. 
47 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries, World Economic 
Outlook, October 2008, p. 204. 
48 IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2009, p. 1. 
  19FX reserves accumulation trend; the effect of society ageing on public pension 
systems; political reactions to SWFs investments and broader political issues; 
financial return on SWFs investments; the effects of the global crisis and 
economic downturn. 
For instance, according to some estimates, if “reserve accumulation 
returned to more moderate growth rates as witnessed on average over the past 20 
years, these figures could turn out lower. SWF assets would then end up at around 
USD 4.2 tr in 2010 and just over USD 7 tr in 2015. If, on the other hand, reserve 
accumulation continued at the pace observed in recent years, SWF asset 
accumulation would accelerate further, bringing the total to over USD 5tr by 2010 
and USD 14tr by 2014”
49. 
  On the other hand, a recent Working Paper presenting a model for 
estimating the size and likely growth of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the countries 
of the Arabian Gulf under different assumptions about oil prices, examined “the 
impact of $25, $50, $75, and $100 oil on the Gulf’s foreign asset growth. If oil 
averages $75 a barrel over the next five years, the portfolio of the […Gulf 
Cooperation Council
50…] official sector would rise to $1.7 trillion. If oil averages 
$100, it will reach $2.1 trillion. Conversely, if oil averages $50 a barrel, most Gulf 
countries would need to curtail spending and planned investment projects to avoid 
a sustained drawdown of their foreign assets – continued interest and dividend 
payments would keep external assets relatively constant with the region’s 
portfolio ending 2012 with $1.4 trillion. At $25 a barrel, the erosion of assets is 
significant, despite continued returns on existing assets – the Gulf’s external 
position would fall to just over $1 trillion”
51. 
Accordingly, only “if oil averages $100 a barrel or more over the next five 
years, the GCC’s assets will resume their rapid expansion and expand to $2.2 
trillion by 2012. Even so the region would fall well short of generating the 
massive sovereign funds implied by those who project that the assets under 
management by sovereign funds would rise to $10 trillion to $12 trillion in 
2012”
52. 
However, SWFs are likely to be among the world's fastest-growing groups 
of institutional investors (Chart 11), and “to become more important participants 
                                                 
49 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, p. 5. In particular the author reported that “by end-2007, global central bank reserves had risen 27% on 
the previous year, driven by reserves in Asia (31%), the Middle East (35%), and Latin America (47%). 
Reserves in the industrialised world, by comparison, grew by a mere 8% in that period”. 
50 Members of the GCC include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
51 Setser B. and Ziemba R., (2009), GCC Sovereign Funds, Reversal of Fortune, working paper, Council on 
Foreign Relations (Center for Geo-economic Studies), January 2009, p. 6.  
52 Ibidem, p. 18.  
  20in global financial markets over the coming years as inflows from trade surpluses 
and commodities exports continue”
53. 
In this respect, in addition to the expected increase in the current SWFs 
size, essentially “fuelled by the continued inflow from government revenues or 
excess reserves”
54, it has been rumoured that new SWFs might be established by 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, India, Japan
55, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and 
Thailand (Table 3). 
  With reference to the distinction between "commodity funds" and "non-
commodity funds", "commodity funds" turn out to be currently larger that "non-
commodity funds", although the latter are expected to grow faster than the former 
"capturing an increasing share of global SWFs, and their 36% share at the end of 
2007 may increase to 40% by 2010 and around half by 2015"
56. 
 
6. SWFs investments: facts, figures and trends 
 
Besides their growth in size and number, significant changes occurred also 
in SWFs use of funds and risk appetite, essentially resulting in greater 
diversification and shifting from sovereign debt to private equity instruments and 
other assets classes, as well as in increasing activism in the markets, making them 
emerge as among the most important institutional investors, although of a special 
“lineage”. As a result, approximately two-thirds of all SWFs investments reported 
between 1995 and 2008 were undertaken as of mid-2007. As noted, “this 
concentration primarily reflects the large investments in financial institutions in 
the US and Europe as observed in the wake of the financial crisis”
57. 
SWFs essentially aim at better diversifying risks and generating higher 
returns than traditional official reserves management by Central Banks and 
Monetary Authorities. As a result, "in searching for greater yield, the 
diversification of SWF’s portfolios from traditional low-risk and highly-liquid 
assets (for example, government bonds) to other securities and derivatives could 
increase liquidity in formerly illiquid corners of the markets"
58 and deliver 
                                                 
53 IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2009, p. 1. 
54 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, p. 4. 
55 The establishment of a Japanese SWF is considered particularly likely, as Japan is deemed to hold an 
amount of reserves greatly exceeding its currency stabilisation needs while experiencing pressure on national 
budget due to its weak fiscal position and ageing population trend (S.L. Jen, Why Japan Should Have Its Own 
Sovereign Wealth Fund, Morgan Stanley Research Global, 2007).  
56 IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2008. 
57 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, p. 7. 
58 Financial Services Authority, Financial Risk Outlook, 2008, p. 54. 
  21benefits usually attached to the presence of large shareholders and institutional 
investors.  
A "malicious observer" could however stress that SWFs may easily invest 
not (or not only) on the basis of purely financial/commercial grounds but upon 
biasing strategic/political considerations, thus raising both "corporate governance" 
and "national interests" concerns in recipient countries. 
Leaving the issue aside, for the time being, at first sight the presence (or 
better the gain in prominence) in the global financial system of investors such as 
SWFs should be considered as positive development, as they typically are: i) 
large; ii) highly liquid (i.e. with very limited constraints in managing their assets); 
iii) long-term investors; iv) not significantly leveraged; v) with relatively high-risk 
tolerance; vi) less sensitive to market conditions than Hedge Funds, Private Equity 
and other institutional investors; vii) prone to diversification (from traditional low-
risk, high-liquid, and low-return assets) in searching for greater yield.  
Due to their characteristics (mainly: long-term investment horizon, little 
concern for liquidity and lack of explicit liabilities) SWFs are generally regarded 
as possible stabilising forces in the global financial market
59. 
Indeed, despite the general lack of a mandatory transparency regime on 
their investment strategies, assets allocation and portfolio composition, the 
general opinion is that SWFs (notably savings and heritage funds) do not follow a 
"hit and run" approach in their investment decisions; instead their long-term 
investment horizon contributes "to the broadening of the long-term investor base 
for risky assets, such as equities, corporate bonds, emerging market assets, private 
equity and real estate. In this regard, such funds could become a more stable 
investor base for risky assets in certain markets. In addition, provided that the 
investments of such funds are driven entirely by risk and return considerations, 
SWFs may contribute to a more efficient allocation and diversification of risk at 
the global level"
60.  
Furthermore, SWFs are well placed to invest in periods of market stress, 
by supplying liquidity where it may be strongly needed and in illiquid corners of 
the market  e.g. "when the global equity market fell sharply between 2000 and 
2002, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund was a large buyer of global 
equities"
61. 
SWFs ability to act as a stabilising force and a significant source of 
liquidity in global financial markets was confirmed and highlighted during the 
current financial markets crisis by the significant (and welcomed) stabilising role 
                                                 
59 See Kern S., (2007), Sovereign Wealth Funds – State Investments on the Rise, Deutsche Bank Research, 
2007. 
60 European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, December, 2007. 
61 Bank of England, Sovereign wealth funds and global imbalances, Quarterly Bulletin, 2008 Q2, p. 199. 
  22played by some SWFs in recapitalisation of some of the biggest US/EU 
commercial and investments banks negatively affected by recent “turbulences” in 
the financial markets (Table 4 and 5). 
  In fact, it has been assessed that since the spread of the sub-prime crisis in 
2007 SWFs have invested between 60 billion USD and 92 billion USD in return 
of large minority stakes in financial institutions
62 (generally lower that 10%), 
“over two-thirds of the capital invested in foreign financial institutions in 2007 
and early 2008 came from Asian SWFs (13% from China), with Middle Eastern 
SWFs generating the remainder”
63. Although SWFs consequently acquired a 
significantly influential position in such companies (recently “counterbalanced” 
by the equity investments also undertaken by EU
64 and US governments under 
their national rescue measures and support schemes for banks and financial 
intermediaries), they typically avoided taking controlling stakes and mainly 
behaved as “passive institutional shareholders”
65. In this respect, even when they 
became “the largest single shareholders in individual banks – which usually puts 
an investor in an elevated position – the state funds have so far refrained from 
claiming board seats and playing a role in either the strategic approach or the day-
to-day operations of their investments”
66, probably also to avoid additional 
regulatory and supervisory burdens. 
For instance, the US Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 
2007 (FINSA)
67 provides for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) review and investigation of “covered transactions” (to be 
completed within 30 days) to determine the transactions effect on national 
security and address national security concerns. In this respect, a “covered 
transaction” stands for “any transaction proposed or pending after 23August 1988, 
by or with any foreign person, which could result in control of a U.S. business by 
a foreign person”
68.  
                                                 
62 Banca d’Italia, Economic Bulletin, n. 51/2008; Citi, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing Global Force, 
2008; Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 
22, 2008, p. 9. 
63 IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2008, p. 2. 
64 
See: Communication from the Commission - The application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (2008/C 270/02). 
65 A recent analysis on the stock price impact of SWFs investments suggested “that SWF investments have a 
strong positive effect on stock prices around the announcement date and no substantial effect on operational 
performance and corporate governance outcomes, consistent with the empirical evidence on the investment 
behaviour of passive institutional shareholders”, Kotter J. and Lel U., (2008), Friends or Foes? The Stock 
Price Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments and the Price of Keeping Secrets, November 1, 2008, p. 
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  23The new final regulations governing CFIUS issued by the U.S. Treasury 
Department on 14 November 2008 by clarifying, inter alia, the key concept of 
“Control” confirm that a “functional test” must be followed by CFIUS – i.e. 
CFIUS shall consider all relevant facts and circumstances rather than applying a 
bright-line test to determine whether a transaction results in foreign control (e.g. 
while expanding the illustrative list of “important matters”, control is defined as 
the “power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised … to determine, direct, or 
decide important matters affecting an entity”). Moreover, with reference to the 
exclusion of “passive investment” from CFIUS review, the new regulations 
clarify that “there is no automatic exclusion for acquisitions of ten percent or less. 
That rule applies only if the investor is passive, maintains that sole intent, and 
takes no action to the contrary”
69. 
As a result, it is evident that the new regulations intentionally omit “any 
bright-line rules regarding control, instead requiring CFIUS to consider all 
relevant facts when determining whether a foreign entity controls a U.S. business. 
Although practitioners had previously focused on a 10% safe harbour threshold 
below which CFIUS would not find control, the final regulations explicitly reject 
the 10% threshold as a safe harbour, except when the investment is solely for the 
purpose of “passive investment”; therefore, this exception does not apply if the 
foreign entity plans or intends to gain control over the U.S. business”
70. 
While attracting the attention (and sometimes concerns) of the wider 
public on SWFs potential influence on developed countries’ economies, the 
significant engagement in the US and EU financial sectors is believed to have 
delivered substantial “reputational benefits” to SWFs. Indeed “following their 
investments in the financial industry – at a time when some banks were facing 
serious problems with regard to their capitalisation, and conventional, market-
based sources of capital had dried out – SWFs have experienced a more benign 
reception in the US and Europe, with policymakers and the wider public 
recognising the helpful role they played in a critical phase of market 
developments”
71.  
The sharp decline in the market value of financial firms hit by the sub-
prime crisis (e.g. Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and UBS) was 
probably one of the main triggers of recent SWFs remarkable interest in the 
financial sector and clear sectoral bias of their investments: SWFs investments in 
financial institutions compared to the value of total SWFs investments increased 
from 3.8% in 2006 to 93.3% by January 2008 (Charts 13 and 14). 
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  24This “could be an indication that some SWFs pursue mean-reverting 
investment strategies. However, the stabilising market impact of these 
investments has been short-lived, as stock prices tended to decline further 
following the SWF acquisitions while CDS spreads narrowed moderately”
72 
(Chart 16). 
In this respect, coeval factors contributing to the recent sharp increase in 
SWFs acquisition of shareholdings in EU and US financial firms have been 
identified in
73:  i) the abundant liquidity and availability of funds allowing 
substantial buying power; ii) the “per se” attractiveness of financial sector as an 
investment target due to the high “return on equity” for banks (“6.9% in the EU-
25 and 12.3% in the US in 2006”) and their “substantial growth and profitability 
potential in the medium and long run”; iii) the transitional attractive investment 
opportunities for long-term investors provided by the sub-prime related financial 
crisis and relative substantive fall in the share price of banks and other financial 
institutions (the market value of most major banks is estimated to have fallen to 
between 60% and 20% since mid-2007); iv) the long-run strategic and commercial 
benefits for SWFs and their sponsor countries’ financial and industrial sectors 
deriving from direct participation in large and well-established banks and 
financial firms; v) the possibility to build trust and increase their reputation as 
credible and reliable institutional investors by playing a helpful role in 
recapitalisation of EU and US distressed financial institutions.  
That said, it is interesting to note that: i) the financial sector proved to be 
the most alluring to SWFs not only in 2007 and 2008 but even prior to the credit 
crisis; ii) the overall volume and value of deals performed in such sector were 
proportionally higher than in other relevant sectors, both in the EU (with the UK 
attracting the largest share of SWFs capital flows, net of investment in the financial 
sector) and US, as well as in Asia (Charts 17–20). 
Although recent SWFs large capital injections in distressed financial 
institutions obviously bias the overall picture, data available indicate that 
investments in the financial sector have been the dominant SWFs investment 
pattern in the US, while in the EU and Asia SWFs investments followed a more 
balanced sectoral distribution. 
Such prominent interest in the EU and US financial sector by SWFs is 
considered to have reached its peak and is thus expected to fade away – at least 
for a while – due to the compounded effect of different factors. For instance, as a 
result of the large equity investments in financial institutions performed as of mid-
2007, SWFs as a group – and in particular a restricted number of most exposed 
SWFs – may now be in the need of reducing the concentration risk in their 
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  25portfolio and increasing their diversification by investing their wealth in other 
sectors. 
Moreover, even though SWFs were invested in EU and US banks and 
financial intermediaries when their market value was very low, “share prices have 
fallen further. By mid-October 2008, the decline in bank share prices since the 
date of the respective SWF investment had ranged from 19% up to 66%. 
Emergency measures, such as recapitalisation and mergers, are set to have 
substantial implications for sovereign stakeholders that most likely were not part 
of the original investment rationale”
74.  
The significant losses so far incurred by SWFs on their portfolio, the still 
volatile and uncertain conditions afflicting both global financial markets and the 
real economy, associated with the uncertainty surrounding the expected political 
and regulatory response, are likely to induce SWFs to take an extremely cautious 
approach versus further involvement in the EU/US financial sector in favour of 
alternative allocation of their wealth, at least for the time being.  
 
 
7. Main concerns on SWFs investments: what is the fuss all about? 
 
Considering the potential benefits attached to SWFs investments, it is not 
instinctive to understand why SWFs investments (especially in equity) are so 
controversial both in the US and EU. 
The main sources of concerns can be summarised as follows: 
o  Blurring boundaries between private and public investors: 
reintroducing, via the “back door”, public ownership into market 
economy, counteracting development towards a more market-based 
financial system; 
o  Lack of transparency: this may interfere with markets efficiency, 
harming competition and limiting the positive effects arising from 
stronger "market discipline". Moreover, the lack of reliable 
information hampers proper assessment of "SWFs phenomenon" 
developments and identification of potential sources of systemic risk. 
For instance, it negatively affects the reliability of IMF instruments 
aimed at increasing transparency on the level and composition of FX 
reserves (e.g. "Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange 
Reserves" data base (COFER) and “Data Template on International 
Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity”, which is part of the Special 
Data Dissemination Standard, SDDS); 
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  26o  Political/strategic purpose of investments: the main concern is that 
SWFs might take investment decisions not based on purely 
economic/financial considerations but biased/driven by political and/or 
strategic objectives; 
o  Adverse impact on corporate governance efficiency: SWFs may 
impose additional “agency costs” by forcing a portfolio company to act 
in their own interest against the interest of other stakeholders; 
o  Strategic relevance of investments: the acquisition of significant stake 
in foreign "national champion" or strategic industries/assets could give 
stance to foreign government intervention to protect national interests 
and/or national security; 
o  Geopolitical implications: the significant acquisition of foreign assets 
in developed countries is per se likely to raise political concerns and 
pressure for protectionism actions; 
o  Concentration of monetary/financial power (impact on global financial 
system): the sheer size and scopes of SWFs rise concerns as to the 
impact of their investment decisions on global financial markets and 
assets prices (e.g. risk of equity price bubbles and increase in 
volatility) and the conduct of monetary and exchange policies (e.g. 
decline in demand for treasury bonds); 
o  Domestic reactions: taxpayers in SWFs sponsor countries may 
question the way SWFs invest their (public) resources (e.g. as 
reported, earlier in 2007, the acquisition of a ten percent stake in 
Blackstone was very vocally criticised by the Chinese press
75); 
o  Target companies' shareholders reaction: UBS faced a backlash from 
investors thinking they were not offered the opportunity to underwrite 
new capital on the same terms offered to GIC (FT, 23.1.08). 
Having said that, the terms of the debate have been mainly revolving 
around the risks attached to the lack of transparency  on SWFs investment 
strategies and shareholdings. For instance, it has been argued that the lack of 
transparency by SWFs (with the significant exception of the Norwegian Pension 
Fund) may mask "market abuse" and "insider trading" practices, raising the cost 
of capital and undermining market confidence. 
In this respect, however, it has been correctly pointed out (Gilson R. J. and 
Milhaupt C. J. – 2008) that SWF "lack of transparency cannot itself be the 
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  27problem, and as a result of that greater transparency cannot itself be the 
solution"
76.  
Indeed, achieving a fair degree of transparency is to be regarded just as an 
"intermediate target" aiming to attain other ultimate policy objectives and not as 
an objective itself. 
It is also fair to say that any shareholder/investor is not per se transparent 
(e.g. Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds) unless required or imposed to do so. 
For instance, it is easy to observe that US and EU laws and regulations 
provide for a considerable comprehensive mandatory disclosure regime (e.g. 
when major holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed
77; in case of 
acquisition and disposal of “qualifying holding” in banks, insurance, financial 
intermediaries, mutual funds and other regulated subjects
78; with reference to 
shareholders' agreements and indirect holdings) where transparency is considered 
an important tool to achieve certain ultimate objectives (e.g. sound and prudent 
management of financial intermediaries, stock market integrity; investors 
protections, etc.). This set of rules and regulation is in principle applicable to 
SWFs and may serve to achieve the desired degree of transparency on SWFs 
equity investments without imposing further regulatory burdens. 
At the same time, the existence of non-transparent investors is also 
allowed under EU and international regulatory frameworks (e.g. no significant 
disclosure rules are usually imposed on “private companies”).  
Therefore, when it comes to SWFs the real concern appears to be not 
exactly or better not only related to their transparency,  rather to their likely 
strategic/political motives in addition to (or instead of) pure commercial/financial 
motives when investing. 
As a result, a fair reading of the current debate should strongly suggest that 
the real fear or concern is that SWFs may use their influence on portfolio 
companies: 
o  to secure technology (an explicit concern in the discussion of the Abu 
Dhabi Fund’s investment in AMD); 
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  28o  to gain access to natural resources, know-how, or confidential 
information; 
o  to improve competitive positions for domestic companies; 
o  to gain competitive advantages; 
o  or in a fashion entailing national security concerns for portfolio 
companies’ country of incorporation. 
Leaving aside, for the time being, concerns related to national security and 
other national interests, it is evident from a microeconomic perspective that a 
conflict of interests among shareholders (and stakeholders) may arise, thus 
harming the position of some shareholders versus others, similarly to what may 
happen in groups of companies (e.g. between the holding company shareholders 
and shareholders of other companies in the group subject to control or dominant 
influence exerted by the holding company), with detrimental effects on corporate 
governance efficiency. 
Indeed, a SWF may not be necessarily interested in maximising the value 
of its portfolio companies' shares, as it should be, instead, the case for “normal” 
public companies' shareholders. 
In particular, this could happen whereby a SWF manages to extract value 
from portfolio companies’ activities : 
o  in ways other that the mere holding of shares in that company; 
o  not accessible to the other shareholders. 
In this case, a given SWF could enjoy a (private)  incentive to exploit 
portfolio companies in order to achieve its own private interests. Such private 
incentives may lead a SWF to impose goals and priorities not necessarily 
consistent with maximisation of its portfolio companies’ value, thus impairing the 
efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms, leading to increasing agency 
costs and declining firms/shares value  and possibly squeezing out minority 
shareholders. 
Due to its "political nature", a SWF is perceived as being strongly prone to 
adopt investment strategies based on strategic/political motives in addition to (or 
instead of) only purely commercial, financial motives  e.g. by transferring know-
how, technology or other resources from a portfolio company, despite reducing 
the value of such portfolio company
79. Indeed, it will be in the position to suffer 
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  29just part of the value loss of its portfolio company, while keeping all the benefits 
arising from transfer of resources. 
In other words, a SWF with private interest can benefit from an improper 
transfer of wealth versus other shareholders, with negative effects on corporate 
governance mechanisms, stock price “signalling” value, overall stock market 
efficiency and firms’ performances, thus making possible regulatory or judicial 
interventions desirable also from an economic point of view. 
 
7.1. SWFs equity investments impact on listed companies 
 
According to corporate governance theories, general consensus is that, in 
principle, equity investments by large institutional shareholders are likely to exert 
a positive impact on firms profitability through better corporate governance and, 
in particular, through the so-called “monitoring effect”  i.e. large institutional 
shareholders have strong incentives (and are able) to strengthen monitoring on 
company’s managers and firms performance while, on the other hand, small 
shareholders lack such incentives (Shleifer and Vishny)
80. For instance, larger 
shareholders turn out to have increased likelihood of hostile takeover or 
managers’ replacement in case of poor performances, as well as portfolio firms’ 
performance and directors’ turnover
81. 
At the same time, however, a different strand of research points out that 
large shareholders are likely to impose "agency costs" on firms as a result of a 
possible “conflict of interest” with other shareholders and stakeholders – i.e. large 
shareholders might force a portfolio company to act in their own interest, against 
the (legitimate) interest of other shareholders, investors, employees, managers, 
creditors and stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling)
82. 
Moreover, it has also been suggested that if large shareholders are not 
sufficiently diversified they may impose additional costs on firms, being keener to 
excessively reduce company specific risks (Demsetz and Lehn)
83. 
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  30As a matter of fact, theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performances highlighted that a trade-
off actually exists between concentrated ownership benefits (higher profitability 
through better monitoring) and related costs (risk of exploitation and/or “asset 
stripping”)
84. 
In particular, it has been observed that initially higher concentration leads 
to higher profitability (through increased monitoring and reduction of agency 
costs). Nevertheless, as ownership concentration increases, largest owners gain 
incentives to take exclusive advantages of their positions, exploiting private 
benefits not shared by minority shareholders and other stakeholders.  
SWFs tend to be large investors, thus capable of improving corporate 
governance of their portfolio companies through better monitoring effect. At the 
same time, being state-backed, they appear particularly likely to impose additional 
“agency costs” on their portfolio firms – e.g. because their assets allocation and 
management are not always necessarily driven by risk-adjusted profit 
maximisation motives, and/or simply by virtue of their low transparency breeding 
uncertainty as to their behaviour as shareholders. 
In this respect, a recent empirical research by Fotak, Bortolotti, and 
Megginson (2008)
85 – sampling 75 investments originated from 16 SWFs and 
related to 62 companies in 23 countries
86 – on the financial impact and 
profitability effect of SWFs investments in stocks of listed companies (proxied by 
abnormal returns of target stocks over 30, 60, 120, 240 and 480 trading days) 
revealed that: "in the two years (one year) following SWF investment, shares of 
target firms average an abnormal buy-and-hold return of negative 40.96% 
(negative 18.17%), which is statistically significant at the 10% (10%) level and 
clearly economically significant as well", suggesting that equity acquisitions by 
SWFs are followed by deteriorating target firms’ long-term performance. 
The research authors were therefore led to conclude that SWFs "have 
negative impact on firm profitability, perhaps, by imposing additional agency 
costs" not overweighed by benefits related to better monitoring. 
At the same time no evidence of a significant relationship has been found 
neither between the magnitude of the abnormal return following SWFs 
investments and the share of equity acquired (i.e. the larger the share of equity 
acquired the stronger the expected "agency costs" effect), nor between the 
investing SWF governance and the investing SWF level of transparency. The 
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  31authors suggest it might be due to the limited sample size and predictors’ lack of 
variability. 
Additionally, the authors investigated how the market assesses/anticipates 
SWFs investment potential impact on target firms. Surprisingly, they found out 
stocks of targeted corporations exhibiting "significantly positive abnormal returns 
averaging about 1% on the day on which the SWF investment is announced", 
showing a short-term welcome/optimistic attitude towards SWFs as shareholders, 
despite their predicted detrimental long-term impact on portfolio firms’ 
profitability. 
The positive market reaction to SWFs capital injection could have been 
explained as the result of most of the recent SWFs investments occurred in 
distressed financial institutions, in urgent need of liquidity. Nevertheless, after in-
depth examination, the authors of the empirical analysis were “forced to conclude 
that the positive short-term market reaction is not due to liquidity influxes in 
distressed companies” and were unable to offer an alternative valid explanation 
for the positive short-term market reaction. 
One possible explanation to such puzzling result may suggest that SWFs 
investments in distressed financial corporations just mitigated their problems – i.e. 
in the absence of SWFs capital injection, deterioration in target firms’ 
performances would have proven even worse.  
A similar analysis (as to the initial stock price impact of 163 
announcements of SWF investments in firms from 28 countries) carried out by 
Kotter and Lel (2008)
87 on SWFs investments wealth effects on target firms’ 
shareholders and on whether higher SWF transparency alleviates concerns on 
SWFs documented that “a risk-adjusted abnormal return of about 2 percent on the 
three-day window surrounding the announcement date. In dollar terms, the mean 
(median) firm’s market value increases by $327 million ($60 million) in the first 
two days of the SWF investment announcement. The magnitude of the average 
CAR is similar to the announcement effects of investments by institutional 
investors on stock returns for a comparable event window (e.g. Wahal, 1996), 
indicating that SWF investments convey a positive signal to market participants 
about the future risk-adjusted returns of target firms”. 
In addition, the analysis revealed that “investors react negatively to the 
announcements of SWFs exiting the firm” and “that SWF transparency plays a 
major role in determining investors’ reaction to the SWF investment 
announcement”. By using the Truman scoreboard
88 to evaluate the SWFs 
structure, governance, accountability, transparency and behaviour, the analysis 
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  32authors suggest that SWFs may pay a price for their lack of transparency – indeed 
they found that firms experience higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) if 
the investing SWF “ranks higher in terms of its overall disclosure standards”. For 
instance, they document that “the average CAR is more than 3.5 percentage points 
higher for firms targeted by SWFs that are subject to independent audits or make 
annual reports publicly available. This finding suggests that investors use 
voluntary SWF disclosure as a signal of the quality of screening and monitoring 
by SWFs”. Not only target firms’ existing shareholders, but also SWFs are 
deemed to benefit from voluntarily improved transparency. 
According to the research authors, the reasons underlying the positive 
market reaction to SWF investments turn out to be different. For instance, the fact 
that significantly higher abnormal returns (i.e. highly positive market reactions) 
are usually positively associated with higher likelihood target firms’ financial 
distress “suggests that SWF investments are particularly valuable for firms in 
greater need of capital in times of financial difficulty, and serve as a certification 
of the firm’s long term economic viability”. Moreover, “the positive market 
reaction may also emanate from investors’ expectation that as strategic investors, 
SWFs can recapitalize the target firm in case of future financial difficulties”. On 
the contrary, no evidence has been found that positive Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns “are driven by a temporary liquidity effect generated by block purchases 
of SWFs”. 
Finally, finding that – compared to a control sample of firms – “target 
firms do not experience any robust and statistically significant change in 
profitability, growth, investment, and corporate governance environment in the 
three year period following the SWF investment” the authors assumed “that SWFs 
do not improve firm value in the long run, implying that shareholder activism is 
not common among SWFs, consistent with the empirical evidence documented 
for U.S. institutional investors”. 
According to another (less extensive) provisional assessment of SWF 
investments impact on the share price of a panel of banks (i.e. Deutsche Bank, 
Citigroup, UBS, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Barclays Bank), 
based on a selection of the most important markets’ recent events, the following 
main conclusions have been drawn by Kern (2008)
89: i) none of the selected SWF 
investments actually broke the strong downward trend followed by the share 
prices of the selected banks between mid-2007 and mid-2008, “one interpretation 
would be that, without SWF investments, individual stocks may have declined 
even further or faster, but a comparison of stock performances and especially with 
the benchmark suggests otherwise”; ii) “SWF investments have had no strong or 
lasting impact on bank share prices”, iii) “even in cases where an event’s impact 
can be identified, the direction of the impact is not homogeneous”, both on 
volatilities and abnormal returns. 
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7.2. SWFs potential impact on global financial markets and 
international imbalances 
 
  SWFs investments stand for a portion of total capital flows between 
countries and are closely related to global imbalances in trade, indeed they mainly 
originate from Balance of Payments surplus posted by Asian and oil exporting 
countries and other emerging economies. As noted, “current account balances are 
the mirror image of capital flows: countries with current account deficits must 
import capital to finance these deficits, while countries with current account 
surpluses export capital to finance the deficits of others”
90. 
  SWFs recent rapid development reflects that when emerging economies 
started run current account surpluses also capitals started “flowing uphill” in the 
global financial markets – i.e. from developing countries (with large “excess 
reserves”) to rich developed countries (capital is flowing "uphill" mainly because 
of the US current account deficits and Chinese current account surpluses) – in 
contrast with the standard economic theory stating that financial capital should, on 
net, flow from richer developed countries to less wealthy developing and 
emerging countries. 
  One of the reasons for such a “paradox” lies in capital flows not being 
necessarily driven by only basic rate-of-return considerations – e.g. they are 
strongly biased by liquidity and/or geopolitical considerations. 
  A recent analysis simulating the impact exerted on global capital flows by 
an increasing transfer of “excess FX Reserves” to SWFs revealed that under the 
main assumption that SWFs behave as “CAPM-type investors” and “thus allocate 
foreign assets according to market capitalisation rather than liquidity 
considerations, official portfolios reduce their “bias” towards the major reserve 
currencies. As a result, more capital flows “downhill” from rich to less wealthy 
economies, in line with standard neoclassical predictions. More specifically, it is 
found that under the assumption of SWFs investing according to market 
capitalisation weights, the euro area and the United States could be subject to net 
capital outflows while Japan and the emerging markets would attract net capital 
inflows”
91.  
  The mentioned “paradox” could also be explained by a “global saving 
glut” due to the significant increase in the global supply of saving over the past 
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  34decades. Indeed it has pointed out “a particularly interesting aspect of the global 
saving glut has been a remarkable reversal in the flows of credit to developing and 
emerging-market economies, a shift that has transformed those economies from 
borrowers on international capital markets to large net lenders” (Ben S. Bernanke, 
2005)
92. The impact of the “global saving glut” would also help explain both the 
increase in the U.S. current account deficit and the currently relatively low level 
of long-term real interest rates. 
  In this respect, high domestic savings could also explain the positive 
correlation highlighted between current account surplus and country's growth rate. 
In other words, they can explain why foreign capitals do not necessarily flow to 
fastest growing developing countries. Indeed, it turns out that “one explanation for 
the positive correlation between the current account surplus and a country's 
growth rate is that higher growth is associated with – and itself generates – higher 
domestic savings. In other words, fast-growing countries may need less foreign 
capital. The problem with this explanation is that, typically, as countries grow 
(that is, when they experience a positive productivity shock), they should want to 
consume more (because they are richer) and invest more (because of the 
investment opportunities). Thus, the correlation should, if anything, be negative. 
This is where the financial system – especially an underdeveloped one – can play 
a role. If the financial sector were deep and efficient, a sustained increase in 
productivity would result not only in more investment (as firms borrow to take 
advantage of investment opportunities) but also in more consumption as 
consumers borrow to consume in anticipation of their higher income. Conversely, 
a weak financial sector could translate a sustained increase in the productivity of 
certain sectors into weaker investment growth and greater savings growth […]. 
Another possibility is that weak financial systems may not help in efficiently 
intermediating foreign capital”
93. However “the seemingly perverse flows of 
capital from poor to rich countries today are not necessarily a sign of 
inefficiencies in global financial markets. Rather, they may indicate financial and 
other structural impediments that limit a poor country's ability to absorb foreign 
capital”
 94. 
  Whatever the case, SWFs recent growth is one of the effects of the 
changing structure of the world’s economic output and the large and persistent 
international imbalances in trade – which may represent a threat to global 
financial stability. 
  Indeed, large current account deficit makes, for instance, a country more 
vulnerable to rapid reversal of capital inflows, and the rapid unwind of external 
imbalances may produce severe negative impact on the concerned country. As 
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  35reported, “a recent IMF study reviewed 42 episodes of large reductions in current 
account deficits in developed countries over the past 40 years. In a quarter of the 
cases, which were mainly countries with limited real exchange rate depreciation, 
annual GDP growth fell by 3½ percentage points on average”
95. Also surplus 
countries are exposed to risks linked to large international imbalances, as foreign 
exchange inflows require significant sterilisation interventions and may generate 
higher inflation and asset price bubbles. 
  That said, SWFs are deemed to play an important role in the (sought) 
unwinding of global imbalances, which requires domestic demand to be curbed in 
deficit countries and increased in surplus countries. Demand may be rebalanced 
through a gradual real exchange depreciation of deficit countries against surplus 
countries. In this respect, the gain in prominence of SWFs is deemed to be “a sign 
that surplus countries may be less willing in future to accept such low yielding 
assets. That should put pressure on exchange rates to adjust and contribute to a 
reduction in global imbalances”
 96. 
  In line with the consideration expressed above as to causes and effects of 
the “global saving glut”, in order to reduce global imbalances it would also be 
important to reduce the current large gap between national savings and national 
investments in Asian and oil-exporting countries.  
Apart from the macroeconomic and geopolitical implications of SWFs 
rapid growth, the increasing transfer of “excess reserves” from central banks and 
monetary authorities portfolios to SWFs is expected to result in a significant 
rebalancing of capital flows in the global financial markets, as SWFs are less 
liquidity-oriented and less risk adverse than monetary authorities in managing the 
asset side of their balance sheet. 
The amount of “excess reserves” of major emerging economies is 
estimated “to exceed $ 3 trillion or more than half of total official foreign 
exchange reserves to date”
97 (Chart 21). 
As SWFs essentially seek to better diversify risks and generate higher 
returns than traditional reserves management, their investments are likely to lead 
to an increasing demand for risky assets and declining investments in US 
treasuries and other government securities. In this respect, 80% of the sovereign 
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  36investors surveyed reportedly increased their portfolio diversification by adding 
new assets classes, including equities, corporate bonds and real assets
98. 
There is general consensus that the increase in size and number of SWFs 
“might trigger a diversification not only out of US dollar assets but also out of 
euro assets, given that official reserves are currently overweight in euro area and 
US government bonds”
99. Nevertheless, actual diversification magnitude will be 
influenced (restrained) by the reserve currency role played by the US dollar and 
the euro, as well as by restrictions on the currency composition of SWFs 
investments resulting from their sponsor countries’ exchange rate and monetary 
policy objectives and SWFs own statutory objectives (e.g. stabilisation funds). 
Some analyses suggest (Jen and St-Arnaud 2007)
100 that the drop in 
demand for US Treasuries due to SWFs moving into equity will not be dramatic 
and very low likelihood exists of US dollar severe depreciation due to divestiture 
from US markets. 
On the other hand, Jen and Miles (2007)
101 noted that “whether national 
governments and central banks are able to remain committed to riskier portfolios 
remains to be seen, as their resolve will be tested by periodic draw-downs”. 
However, they estimated that “the emergence of SWFs could, ceteris paribus, 
push up ‘safe’ bond yields over the next ten years by 30-40bps and reduce the 
equity risk premium by 80-110bps”. Moreover, possible migration of funds from 
the US dollar and Euro to emerging market currencies should put upward pressure 
on the latter (Jen, 2007)
102. 
  In order to asses the potential impact on global assets price exerted by (i) 
the reduction in SWFs incremental purchase of US Treasuries, (ii) the selling of a 
portion of their current US Treasuries and (iii) the reallocation of their 
investments to global equities and global bonds proportionately to the world 
market weights, a recent study by State Street
103 assumed that over time the 
collective asset allocation of SWFs will approximately resemble the asset 
allocation of a typical pension fund: 60% equities, 30% bonds and 10% 
alternatives.  
  With reference to global equity values, it emerged that if SWFs were to 
allocate 60% of their estimated 3 trillion USD AUM to the FTSE Global All Cap 
Index, they would own approximately 5.2% of each company in the Index, or 
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  37circa 5.5% of each company in the MSCI All Country World Index. Allocating 
60% of SWFs assets to equities is expected to likely reduce the global equity risk 
premium and increase the real bond yield.  
  So as to estimate the impact on future capital flows of “excess reserves” 
reallocation into SWFs, Beck and Fidora (2008)
104 assumed that traditional 
reserve portfolios are allocated across currencies as reported in the IMF’s COFER 
database, while SWFs follow an allocation strategy similar to private asset 
managers’ (i.e. based on a ten-year average of global market capitalisation 
weights). 
  Under this and other simplifying assumptions (e.g. not considering the 
effect on exchange rates of a large shift out of US dollars and liquidity 
considerations) it emerged that the shift out of capital to more risky markets due 
to SWFs investments would trigger: 
o  “net capital outflows out of US assets at an order of magnitude of around 
USD 500 billion. This net outflow is entirely due to the large reduction in 
demand for US bonds”. In particular, “the outflow out of the US bond 
market is partly offset by an inflow into US equity markets, given the large 
size of US equity markets, which currently account for roughly 45% of 
world stock market capitalisation”; 
o  “net capital outflows out of euro area assets”. In particular, “the net inflow 
into euro area equities of around USD 200 billion would be more than 
offset by net outflows from euro area bonds of around USD 400 billion. In 
other words, official reserve assets are currently more overweighed in euro 
area bonds than underweighted in euro area equities, when taking 
portfolios based on market capitalisation as a benchmark”. 
  Finally the simulation showed that the expected net capital outflow from 
developed countries would result in net capital inflow to emerging and developing 
countries (mainly reflecting the large weight of such countries in global capital 
markets and their limited role as issuers of reserve currencies), thus proving that 
the mentioned “Lucas Paradox” (i.e. capital flow “uphill” from developing to 
developed economies) could be explained by a “reserve portfolio bias”, i.e. only 
developed countries’ currencies are widely regarded as proper reserve currencies. 
  Indeed, as noted by Beck and Fidora (2008) in “a situation in which SWFs 
behave as CAPM-type investors and thus allocate foreign assets according to risk 
and return rather than liquidity considerations, official portfolios lose this “bias” 
towards the major reserve currencies. As a result, more capital flows “downhill”. 
In fact, anecdotal evidence as well as some available data on Singapore’s 
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  38Temasek suggest that many SWFs indeed have an already high exposure to 
emerging markets”
 105. 
  With reference to the impact on global fixed income values, empirical 
studies of the US Treasury market suggest that annual net foreign purchases 
lowered long rates on US 10-years Treasury Yield by 130 basis points
106. The 
situation could be to some extent reversed by the increasing transfer of “excess 
reserve” to SWFs. Therefore, the above “130 basis point” value could be 
considered as an “upper bound” estimate of the possible rise in the US yields as a 
result of foreign central banks greater diversification (reducing their purchase of 
US Treasuries) and SWFs (selling a portion of their existing US Treasuries). 
  Finally, as SWFs increasingly diversify their portfolio, the expected 
impact on world currencies of their investments is deemed to put further pressure 
on the US dollar. Nevertheless, being global FX market trade equal to circa 3 
billion USD a day, the general sentiment is that the impact could be small. 
 
 
8. Is there a solid economic rationale for a (EU) regulatory 
intervention? 
 
In order to assess whether, in light of the above issues, an economic 
rationale for a possible (EU) regulatory intervention actually exists, it would be 
useful to refer to some basic financial regulation principles. 
  Firstly, markets are permeated by widespread “market failures” or, better, 
“market imperfections” (e.g. public goods, externalities, incomplete information, 
incomplete markets, etc.). Nevertheless, the mere lack of first-best private 
incentives to eliminate market imperfections does not necessarily make a 
regulatory intervention desirable per se.  
  In other words, market imperfections cannot per se justify regulatory 
interventions. It is instead necessary to verify whether the market 
response/solution to market imperfection(s) can actually be cost-effectively 
replaced or improved/enhanced by government. 
  Indeed, although markets do not necessarily provide first-best incentives to 
behave as efficiently as possible, (sometimes) they could however provide very 
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  39good incentives – at the same time regulators not always have first-best incentives 
either. 
  At the end of the day, public regulation appears to make sense whereby 
incentives for regulators “to do the right thing” outweigh strong private incentives 
not to behave efficiently (e.g. the real economic and policy problem “with a 
monopoly is not that the monopolist has slightly less than optimal incentives to 
charge the efficient price, it is that the monopolist has very strong incentives to 
charge a higher than efficient price”
107). 
  As a result, regulation is less likely to make sense when market players 
already have strong (though not “first-best”) incentives to develop an efficient 
solution to a market imperfection – e.g. possible critical issues and additional 
costs posed by general SWFs lack of transparency lead some of the most 
important SWFs to develop a set of best practices aimed, inter alia, at increasing 
disclosure and building trust in recipient countries (i.e. SWFs “Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices” – GAPP). 
In this respect, it is worth noting that, from a microeconomic perspective, 
SWFs equity investments “produce” an important market imperfection 
(externality) resulting from: 
o  the uncertainty as to their behaviour as shareholders, and 
o  the suspicion of political/strategic motive, 
both supported and intensified by their general lack of transparency. 
  In other words, the SWFs veil of secrecy can be used as an excuse to aim 
or simply give room to the adoption of protectionism policies by SWFs 
investments recipient countries or defensive measures by target companies, 
possibly disrupting the interested financial markets or, at least, making their 
functioning far less efficient (e.g. imposing additional costs on market participants 
and/or reducing the amount of FDI/financial resources available for investment in 
the EU/global financial markets).  
  In order to avoid the negative externality “produced” by their lack of 
transparency and public ownership SWFs need to build trust. 
  At the same time, as uncertainty and instability impose significant costs 
not only on SWFs but on all market participants as well, SWFs receive significant 
incentives to cooperate to devise institutions, rules, and behaviours minimising 
such costs, as they will gain mutual benefits. 
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  40  According to the so-called “Coase Theorem”
108, when trade of 
externalities is possible, there are no transaction costs and all parties are free to 
bargain, then the market is always able to efficiently accommodate possible 
imperfections in the most efficient way, leading to an efficient outcome and 
market allocation, regardless of the initial allocation of property rights and 
without any regulatory intervention (which, under these assumptions, is likely to 
produce a “government failure” as deleterious as market failures). 
  Under the Coase Theorem assumptions, externality is not a problem in 
itself (e.g. pollution or, in our case, the uncertainty and suspicion related SWFs 
investment motives); the problem is, inter alia, that both parties affected by 
externality deem their respective position justified. 
 In  this  context,  the legal system role should be limited to assigning and 
protecting property rights and letting the market work toward efficient solutions – 
i.e. with specific reference to issues raised by SWFs investments, “protecting 
property rights” requires that the threat of protectionist reaction should be 
credible. 
  That said, unlike the Coase Theorem textbook assumptions, the real world 
offers significant positive transaction costs. Therefore efficient allocation of 
resources might require market forces action to be complemented (but not 
replaced) with regulatory interventions. 
  Therefore, for the time being, an efficient regulatory policy response to 
specific issues raised by SWFs investments should be firstly aimed (and limited) 
at minimising the transaction costs between SWFs and other stakeholders, thus 
allowing for cheaper correction by the same market participants of possible 
misallocation of resources resulting from the suspicions and uncertainty 
surrounding SWFs strategies and investment motives. 
  In this respect, the catalyst role played by the EU, IMF and OECD in order 
to facilitate development of reasonable market solutions (i.e. voluntary codes of 
conduct for SWFs and recipient countries) appears to be the most appropriate for 
the time being. 
  On the other hand, in inefficient markets the prices paid/received for goods 
and services are far from being optimal – namely while someone is gaining, some 
others are losing – e.g. SWFs may be taking advantage of privileged information 
by the government while competing with private undertakings and/or benefit from 
private interests in portfolio companies via their voting rights or other means. 
  In this case, any efficiency increase would result in a transfer of wealth 
from one group of participants to others; the party benefiting from inefficiency 
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  41(e.g. SWFs) therefore do not have much incentive to change things and, as a 
result, market forces alone are not likely to lead to efficient outcomes, thus 
making a (EU harmonised) regulatory intervention more desirable.  
 
 
9.    A possible (proportionate) regulatory framework for SWF 
investments  
  As stated above, due to SWFs characteristics, SWFs may potentially exert 
significant positive effects on the operation of global capital markets; nevertheless 
if their investments are not entirely driven by genuine risk/return objectives – 
instead biased by political and strategic purposes – they can produce negative 
effects on portfolio companies, markets efficiency and stability and other national 
interests. The acquisition of significant holdings in foreign companies, for 
instance, could be just aimed at allowing the ultimate beneficial owner (a 
sovereign state) to influence such companies’ management in order to extract 
“private benefits” from portfolio companies’ activities or in a fashion entailing 
national security concerns for the portfolio company’s country of incorporation. 
  In this regard, in light of the significant geopolitical effect of SWFs 
investments, it has been suggested that we should prove the "courage to admit that 
dealing with SWFs may require departures from the conventional liberal 
orthodoxy concerning global trade and investment flows"
109. 
  Indeed, concerns over SWFs political goals induced the US and some EU 
Member States (Greece, Germany, France) to envisage protectionism measures 
against SWF investments, showing that, in the end, “international cash flows are 
always political”
110 and to some extent confirming the view Keynes expressed in 
a famous article highlighting the benefits of national self-sufficiency and 
economic autarchy. 
  In particular, Keynes noted that "the policy of an increased national self-
sufficiency is to be considered, not as an ideal in itself, but as directed to the 
creation of an environment in which other ideals can be safely and conveniently 
pursued"
111. Indeed, Keynes becomes convinced that the retention of private 
enterprises structure is compatible with greater material well-being only if the 
interest rate is reduced towards a vanishing point, “but under a system by which 
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  42the rate of interest finds a uniform level, after allowing for risk and the like, 
throughout the world under the operation of normal financial forces, this is most 
unlikely to occur”. Accordingly, Keynes was persuaded that "economic 
internationalism embracing the free movement of capital and of loanable funds as 
well as of traded goods may" may result in a "much lower degree of material 
prosperity than could be attained under a different system", and so pointed out that 
"there is no prospect for the next generation of a uniformity of economic system 
throughout the world, such as existed, broadly speaking, during the nineteenth 
century; that we all need to be as free as possible of interference from economic 
changes elsewhere, in order to make our own favourite experiments towards the 
ideal social republic of the future; and that a deliberate movement towards greater 
national self-sufficiency and economic isolation will make our task easier, in so 
far as it can be accomplished without excessive economic cost" (the importance of 
the last assumption is to be underscored). 
  For example, a recent study on economic growth and capital flows 
revealed that non-industrial countries “that had high investment ratios and lower 
reliance on foreign capital (lower current account deficits) grew faster – on 
average, by about 1 percent a year – than countries that had high investment but 
also a greater degree of reliance on foreign capital”
112. 
  That said, apart from possible negative effects on EU financial markets 
and corporate governance efficiency, from a legal point of view under the acquis 
communautaire any protectionist measure against SWFs equity investments is 
likely to breach the EC Treaty provisions on free competition and, in particular, 
the general prohibition to "all restrictions on the movement of capital between EU 
Member States and between EU Member States and third countries" provided by 
Art. 56 EC Treaty – as emerged with reference to the “golden share" provisions 
adopted by some EU Member States (Italy, France, Spain, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany) to protect (i.e. keep under political 
influence/control) their “national champions” and privatised companies
113. 
                                                 
112 Prasad E., Rajan R. and Subramanian A., (2007), The Paradox of Capital, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Finance & Development, March 2007, Vol. 44, No1.  
113 As noted the recent golden share jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice has “substantially 
supranationalized the rules of member state involvement in formerly state-owned enterprises – whether such 
involvement was in the form of a formal privileged stake in the enterprise, the product of specifically targeted 
regulation, or some hybrid arrangement. […] The European Court of Justice‘s judgments in these cases can 
be viewed as a simple elaboration of long-standing principles of European law grounded in basic provisions 
of the Treaties – principally the nondiscrimination and free movement of capital obligations – in the 
amplification of a harmonized company law. From a choice-of-law perspective the Court‘s approach 
represents a greater effort to move choice of law issues up from the member state to the European level, 
thereby harmonizing and eliminating the horizontal choice-of-law issue”, Backer L.C., (2008), The Private 
Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the 
Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2008 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1135798), p. 7. 
  43According to the consolidated jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
114, 
“movements of capital” for the purposes of Article 56 include: 
o  direct investments, in the form of participation in an undertaking 
through the holding of shares which confers the possibility of 
effectively participating in its management and control, 
o  portfolio investments, acquisition of shares on the capital market solely 
with the intention of making a financial investment without any 
intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking. 
  With regard to the above forms of investment, the Court stated "that 
national measures must be regarded as ‘restrictions’ within the meaning of Article 
56(1) EC if they are likely to prevent or limit the acquisition of shares in the 
undertakings concerned or to deter investors of other EU Member States from 
investing in their capital". 
In line with the above rules and principles – considering inter alia that 
SWFs have to comply with the very EU and national legislation that any other 
investors shall respect while investing in the EU – EU institutions have so far 
supported an approach to SWFs aimed at avoiding the risk of sending the 
misleading signal “that the EU is stepping back from its commitment to an open 
investment regime”
115 by urging Member States not to adopt unilateral 
protectionism measures and ruling out, as far as possible, the adoption of SWF 
specific regulations or the imposition of limitations to the inward flows of 
capitals. Such approach favoured harmonised policies aimed at increasing relevant 
information disclosure, transparency and predictability of SWFs investment 
decisions and their responsibility (i.e. not to disrupt proper functioning of EU 
financial markets and/or not to “plumber” target companies) mainly through “soft 
law” and self-regulatory instruments (guidelines, best practices) and, however, 
through a market–friendly, tailored, proportionate and transparent regulatory 
approach (mainly based on existing EU and Member States’ legal instruments 
applicable to cross-border investments in general)
116. 
As a result, considering SWFs "blurred" nature and the cross-jurisdictional 
features of their transactions (giving room to regulatory arbitrage, possibly 
weakening the effectiveness of actual and possible statutory regulatory measures), 
at present a balanced and proportionate approach to SWFs issues may just entail 
complementing existing EU legal instruments and provisions with specific SWFs 
“soft law” instruments and guidelines and an “indirect” monitoring and 
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  44supervisory framework
117 of SWFs investments and other financial markets 
activities. 
  In particular, in order to devise a proper SWFs regulatory framework, it 
might be useful to follow a two-layer approach of “self-regulation within a 
statutory framework”, as the one widely adopted in Europe for stock exchanges 
regulation.  
 Additionally,  considering that – as noted by the EU Commission – SWFs 
greater transparency “is also important to ensure SWFs are included in global 
surveillance of financial markets”
118, it appears that public monitoring and 
supervision on SWFs may be mainly and/or primarily focused on the phase of the 
“integration” of SWFs financial resources in recipient countries’ economy and 
markets, and aimed at increasing the overall level of transparency as well as 
strengthening supervision on entities, intermediaries and infrastructure used by 
SWFs to finalise relevant transactions and manage their assets (e.g. recipient 
companies, financial intermediaries, regulated markets, payment systems, central 
depositories, central counterparties (CCPs), and other post-trading firms). 
  In this respect, it is useful to recall, inter alia, the provisions introduced (in 
2005) in the Italian Financial Consolidated Act (Legislative Decree n. 58 of 24 
February 1998) in order to increase transparency (thus market discipline) on 
relationships between Italian listed companies and foreign companies having their 
registered office in a country whose legal system does not ensure transparency as 
to their establishment, assets and liabilities, and operations. The same provisions 
also apply to Italian companies with financial instruments widely distributed 
among the public and affiliated with or controlled by such foreign companies. 
  Pursuant to Articles 165ter–165septies of the Italian Financial 
Consolidated Act, Italian listed companies linked, controlled or under the 
influence of “foreign non transparent companies” (e.g. SWF) should attach to 
their Annual Report a Relation, signed by CEO and CFO, illustrating the 
relationship existing with the “foreign non transparent companies”. The Italian 
Securities Commission is entrusted with significant supervision and on-site 
inspection powers, while relevant countries are identified in joint decrees issued 
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  45by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Economy and Finance (against 
criteria listed in the same Italian Financial Consolidated Act). 
  Moreover, an “indirect” supervisory and regulatory framework narrowly-
tailored on the specific concerns raised by SWFs investments (i.e. fear of non-
commercial, strategic or political motives) may be based – as suggested (Keller, 
2008) – on the mandatory requirement for a SWF to conduct investments over a 
certain threshold (or investments of certain kinds) through third-party professional 
asset managers or alternatively to disclose its shareholder voting records whereby 
the ownership percentage in a company exceeds a given threshold
119.  
  In particular, delegating SWFs investments execution to external 
independent asset managers would help ensure that, at least, their single 
investments are not influenced or managed by SWFs sponsor countries’ political 
bodies or parties. Indeed, as noted by the U.S. SEC Chairman, “to the extent 
sovereign investing is conducted through professional management of these funds, 
this could help to de-politicize the process both in practice and in perception”
120, 
thus also increasing transparency of sovereign business and investments and 
contributing to establishment of mutual trust and investor confidence. 
The mandatory use of external asset managers may deliver additional 
advantages for SWFs, without imposing significant compliance costs or disrupting 
their operations. 
Indeed (Keller, 2008) the experience of pension funds (a recent study 
esteemed that the “fraction of assets managed by external managers” is, on 
average, 84.2% of pension fund assets and, “more significantly, a substantial 
number of funds delegate corporate governance responsibility, including voting 
authority, to their external portfolio managers”
121) may suggest that external asset 
management “is likely to produce the best risk-adjusted returns” and “is one 
means of preventing […internal…] conflicts of interest, as well as insider trading 
and other potential abuses”. Moreover the “delegation of investment functions to 
third-party managers may result in greater investment passivity. This correlation, 
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  46if realised, could allay some of the fear of the influence that SWFs would 
exert”
122 on their portfolio companies. 
 capabilities” .  
  Such conclusions appear to be supported by the fact that, although the use 
of outside asset managers may give room to various problems (e.g. a conflict of 
interest between the (short-term) interests of the outside investment manager and 
the long-term interests of the SWF, as well as increase in transaction costs and 
reduced overall return for smaller SWFs), SWFs are already extensively using and 
relying on external money managers. For instance, the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority reportedly “outsources between 70% and 80% of its assets, while the 
Kuwait Investment Authority outsources at least 50%”
123. According to the 
survey carried out by the IMF and the IWG-SWF, “only two of the responding 
SWFs do not use external managers at all, although one of them is actively 
considering this possibility. In contrast, some SWFs have assigned most or all of 
their assets to external asset managers. External managers are used in cases where 
the managing agency does not have sufficient expertise in managing specific 
assets, or where it is not cost-effective to manage them in-house due to the 
external mangers’ economies of scale and extensive research
124
The results of the survey also showed that the appointment/removal of 
external managers (typically approved by the SWF Board) is essentially based on 
delivered performances, although “some SWFs indicate that the organization, the 
personnel team, and the investment philosophy of the external managers are also 
considered important factors. Fees could be flat, performance-based, or a 
combination of both […(Chart 22)…]. Consultants are not commonly used to 
assist in the selection process, except by some smaller SWFs or for specific advice 
in specialized areas”. 
With reference to the disclosure of SWF shareholder voting policies and 
voting records, it has been argued (Lowery C. – 2008)
125 that “in looking at both a 
large sovereign wealth fund (Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global) and a 
large U.S. state pension fund (CalPERS) which exercise their voting rights, two 
things stand out. One is the utility of laying out in advance the broad policies that 
guide how the fund votes, in order to avoid undue, unwelcome surprises. Another 
is the utility of disclosing the actual votes themselves, so that outside observers 
                                                 
122
 Keller A. D., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles of Strategic Ambition? 
(September 11, 2008), Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264349), p. 55. 
123
 At the same time, “winning business from sovereign funds requires more work than for typical 
institutional clients. Training and educating the fund's staff often is expected to come with managing the 
assets. The funds also expect more disclosure about the money manager's own business”. J. Cooper, (2008), 
Sovereign wealth fund hires no cinch, Potential treasure trove of business awaits, but getting to it won't be a 
walk in the park, Pensions&Investments, March 17, 2008 (www.pionline.com). 
124  IWG Secretariat in collaboration with the Members of the IWG, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Current 
Institutional and Operational Practices, September 15, 2008, p. 17. 
125 Remarks by Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery at Barclays Capital’s 12th 
Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference, (hp-836), February 25, 2008. 
  47can assess whether the fund is following its stated broad policies”. In particular, 
such a disclosure regime could assumingly “alleviate the risk of political 
interference by the SWFs government-owners in the business decisions of the 
companies in which they invest, and would alert the market of troublesome voting 
patterns, reducing the danger of capital misallocation and market inefficiency”
126, 
without imposing too severe restrictions on SWFs equity investments or 
significantly impairing their operation, and in particular without denying them the 
possibility to exercise the legitimate rights and powers attached to their 
shareholdings. 
In this respect, if compared with the idea of suspending the voting rights 
attached to SWFs shareholdings (Gilson R. J. and Milhaupt C. J. – 2008)
127 or 
other further incisive protectionist measures, a (mandatory) disclosure regime of 
voting policies and voting records (for SWFs that decided to exercise their voting 
rights) appears to have less unwanted or detrimental “side effects”
128 and to be a 
much more proportionate and flexible solution to issues and concerns raised by 
SWFs equity investments. 
In order to develop a mandatory disclosure regime for SWFs voting 
policies and voting records, it is useful to refer, inter alia, to the provisions 
introduced in 2003 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
requiring management investment companies (mutual funds) registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 to: (i) disclose in their registration statement 
(and, for closed-end funds, in the Form N-CSR) “the policies and procedures that 
they use to determine how to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities”; (ii) file 
with the SEC “and to make available to shareholders the specific proxy votes that 
they cast in shareholder meetings of issuers of portfolio securities”
129. 
                                                 
126 Keller A. D., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles of Strategic Ambition? 
(September 11, 2008), Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264349), p. 57. 
127 Gilson R. J. and Milhaupt C. J., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds and corporate governance: a minimalist 
response to the new merchantilism (February 18, 2008), Stanford University Law and Economics Olin Paper 
No 355, Columbia University Law and Economics Olin Paper No 328 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095023), p. 
21. 
128  For instance, any restrictions imposed on SWFs voting rights could: i) result in undue constraint to 
investors’ formal mechanism of corporate governance, ii) reduce shareholders control over the Board for 
decisions it makes on behalf of the corporation, iii) encourage “bad behaviour” and “incentivise using 
informal means to get their voices heard in the shadows of the corporation”, iv) reduce relevant markets 
attractiveness, v) induce retaliatory response by SWFs sponsor countries with a consequent backwards step 
toward reciprocal open markets, Keller A. D., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: Trustworthy Investors or 
Vehicles of Strategic Ambition? (September 11, 2008), Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, 2008 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264349), pp. 61-64. 
129 See: Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy 
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 17 CFR Parts 239, 249, 270, and 274, 
Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922; File No. S7-36-02, RIN 3235-AI64; Remarks by Treasury 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery at Barclays Capital’s 12th Annual Global Inflation-
Linked Conference, (hp-836), February 25, 2008; Clarke K.K and Miller P. M., (2003), Complying with the 
SEC’s new proxy voting rules, Journal of Investment Compliance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 1, pp. 22-25; Watt K., 
(2003), Proxy Voting Trends: Funds Managers in the United States of America and Australia, Bond Law 
Review, Special Issue: Comparative Corporate Governance, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2003, Article 3, pp. 12-46.  
  48At European level, reference could be made to the “Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to 
Move Forward” Action Plan adopted in 2003 in response to the 
Recommendations issued by the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
(presented in 2002), where the European Commission included in the list of 
proposed medium-term (2006-2008) actions for the adoption of (legislative) 
measures aimed at “enhancing disclosure by institutional investors of their 
investment and voting policies”. 
In particular, the European Commission recommended that institutional 
investors – esteemed to “hold significant proportions of the share capital of 
companies in many Member States (reaching up to 50% of all ordinary shares 
listed in the UK as on 31.12.2004)”
130 – “should be obliged: a) to disclose their 
investment policy and their policy with respect to the exercise of voting rights in 
companies in which they invest; b) to disclose to their beneficial holders at their 
request how these rights have been used in a particular case”
131. In the 
Commission’s opinion “such requirements would not only improve the internal 
governance of institutional investors themselves, but would also enhance 
participation by institutional investors in the affairs of the companies in which 
they invest”; so indirectly recognising that the important role that institutional 
investors (SWFs included) could play in the governance of companies in which 
they invest should not be frustrated by limiting their ability to vote their shares but 
should instead be fostered through a properly designed disclosure regime. 
With specific reference to SWFs equity investments, also the U.S. 
Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs recently stated that the right 
of SWFs to vote their shares should not be questioned, because the right of the 
owner of certain classes of equity securities “to vote on major matters of corporate 
policy and the board of directors […] is one of the most fundamental rights of 
ownership in U.S. corporations. It is integral to the vitality and attractiveness of 
our capital markets”
132. 
                                                 
130 See: European Commission, (2005), Directorate General for internal market and services, Consultation 
on future priorities for the action plan on modernising company law and enhancing corporate governance in 
the European Union, p. 7. 
131  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Modernising 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward”, 
Brussels, 21.5.2003, COM (2003) 284 final, p. 13. 
132 See: Remarks by Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery at Barclays Capital’s 
12th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference, (hp-836), February 25, 2008. 
  49As to effective adoption of a EU mandatory voting disclosure regime for 
institutional investors, it has been argued that – despite stakeholders’ opposition 
during the public consultation lunched by the European Commission in 2005 on 
future priorities for the Action Plan presented in 2003
133 – “the examination of the 
U.S. experience with a similar rule provided valuable insights and arguments to 
overcome the concerns of the sceptics. Similar to the U.S. situation prior to the 
implementation of mandatory disclosure rules, the success of voluntary solutions 
as well as the reliance on market forces are not adequate substitutes for a 
mandatory rule in order to achieve disclosure to the extent intended by the 
proposal. There are also good reasons not to leave the adoption of a disclosure 
rule to the member states, but to realize the proposed EC legislation”
134. 
The results of the consultation launched in 2005 show, inter alia, clear 
support to widest application of “Better Regulation” principles to the field of 
company law and corporate governance. In particular, according to the European 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services (Charlie McCREEVY) “it means 
only legislating at EU level when that is the best level at which to act and where 
legislation is the only answer. We need to opt for instruments that put the least 
burden on companies and leave them as much flexibility as possible. Therefore, 
we will prefer a recommendation to a directive where a recommendation is suited 
to achieve the aim pursued. We will look at the measures originally proposed to 
see if they are still appropriate. For example, whether a directive is really needed 
on disclosure for institutional investors or whether the market is already moving 
in the right direction”
135.  
In this respect, over recent years market-led solutions seem to have been 
encouraging institutional investors to disclose their voting policies to the public 
and the records of the execution of their votes to actual beneficial owners, thus 
making an EU legislative intervention less necessary or not always desirable.  
                                                 
133  In particular, “44 percent of all respondents to the consultation addressed the issue of disclosure of 
institutional investors' voting policies. […] Respondents who opposed an intervention at EU level did so for a 
variety of reasons. While certain respondents considered that such matters are to be left to the contractual 
arrangements between institutional investors and their underlying beneficiaries, others are doubtful of the 
added-value of disclosure. In their view, either disclosure is of a general nature and therefore of little use, or it 
is precise and would subject institutional investors to excessive burdens. Other respondents pointed to the 
initiatives which have been taken both at international level (notably by the OECD and the ICGN) and at 
national level, including self-regulatory codes of conduct and consider that such mechanisms not only 
function satisfactorily but also cater for the flexibility which market participants require, so that additional 
EU intervention would not be necessary or, at any rate, premature at this stage”, European Commission, 
(2005), Directorate General for internal market and services, Consultation and hearing on future priorities for 
the action plan on modernising company law and enhancing corporate governance in the European Union, 
Summary report, p. 12. 
134 Schmolke K. U., (2006), Institutional Investors’ Mandatory Voting Disclosure – European Plans and U.S. 
Experience, New York University School of Law, NYU Center For Law And Economics, October 2006, 
Law&Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-43 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=938116), p. 47.  
135 See: Charlie McCREEVY, (2005), European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Company 
Law Action Plan: Setting Future Priorities, European Corporate Governance Conference, London, 14 
November 2005, Speech/05/683. 
  50  With specific reference to SWFs, for example, the issue has been 
addressed in the context of the adoption of the so-called “Santiago principles” 
(GAPP) – namely, a voluntary set of principles and practices supported and 
implemented by the IWG members to “identify a framework of generally 
accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate governance and 
accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices by 
SWFs on a prudent and sound basis”. 
Indeed, while clearly stating that “SWFs view shareholder ownership 
rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments’ value”
136, GAAP 
Principle No 21 also provides that “if an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership 
rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and 
protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should publicly disclose 
its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors 
guiding its exercise of ownership rights”. 
Within the GAPP framework, disclosure of SWFs policies concerning the 
exercise of voting rights and other ownership rights is primarily intended as a 
proportionate measure “to dispel concerns about potential noneconomic or 
nonfinancial objectives” of SWFs equity investments. 
To such end, IWG members deem that both ex-ante and ex-post disclosure 
of relevant information is required. In particular, with reference to GAAP 
Principle No 21, it has been specified that “SWFs should disclose ex ante whether 
and how they exercise their voting rights. This could include, for example, a 
public statement that their voting is guided by the objective to protect the financial 
interests of the SWF. In addition, SWFs should disclose their general approach to 
board representation”. Moreover, “to demonstrate that their voting decisions 
continue to be based on economic and financial criteria, SWFs could also make 
appropriate ex post disclosures”
137. 
  As a result, in line with the renewed European Commission’s support to 
widest application of “Better Regulation” principles (e.g. systematic regulatory 
impact assessments, legislation only when needed, light touch regulation, etc.) – 
notably to EU company law and corporate governance regulations – and 
considering that at international level significant measures are going to be 
developed or have already been adopted on a voluntary basis to address some of 
the main issues raised by SWFs management and investments – the efficiency and 
effectiveness of market-based instruments should be assessed prior to taking any 
formal EU legislative measure regulating SWFs.  
                                                 
136 As clarified, the exercise of voting and other ownership rights is seen to be important by some SWFs for 
their capacity to hold assets on a long term, patient basis and also “as a mechanism for keeping the 
management of a company accountable to the shareholders, and thus contributing to good corporate 
governance and a sound allocation of resources”, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices. “Santiago Principles”, 
October 2008, p. 23. 
137 Ibidem. 
  51 In  particular,  reliance on third-party external asset manager already 
appears to be a common practice among SWFs, while disclosure of SWFs voting 
policies and records has been already recommended by the “Santiago Principles” 
adopted, on a voluntary basis, by IWG-SWF members. Consequently, an 
additional EU formal regulation may be deemed not necessary or, at any rate, 
premature, at least for the time being.  
  Accordingly, the proposed “light” and “indirect” regulatory approach 
appears most appropriate to tackle market failures associated with SWF 
investments (namely, the fear of non-commercial, strategically or politically-
motivated investments) and most consistent with self-regulatory guidelines to be 
promptly developed by most important SWFs (through the International Working 
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds) and the OECD, and does not (significantly) 
frustrate the EU principle “of an open market economy with free competition” an 
the commitment to keep EU markets “open for investments”. 
Moreover the herein proposed “two-layer” and indirect regulatory 
approach – primarily aimed at increasing transparency and disclosure on SWFs 
operations through the combined effect of statutory and self-regulatory provisions 
– appears to be also in line with the spirit of the recommendations to the EU 
Commission recently endorsed in the European Parliament Resolution of 23 
September 2008 on transparency of institutional investors (covering Hedge Funds, 
Private Equity, and SWFs). 
Indeed, the European Parliament Resolution requested the Commission to 
submit appropriate legislative proposals – pursuant to Articles 44, 47(2) or 95 EC 
Treaty, depending on the subject matter – guaranteeing a common standard of 
transparency (e.g. on proportion of voting rights resulting from an acquisition or 
disposal of shares whereby that proportion reaches, exceeds or falls below specific 
thresholds; on investment policies and associated risks) and tackling other specific 
issues covering Hedge Funds and Private Equity
138, as well as to encourage 
improvements in transparency and governance (e.g. reinforce long-term 
orientation and discourage financial and other incentives for short-term excessive 
risk-taking and irresponsible behaviour) by supporting and monitoring the 
evolution of self-regulation already introduced by managers of Hedge Funds and 
Private Equity and their counterparts, and to encourage Member States to support 
such efforts through dialogue and exchange of best practices. 
Additionally – as to SWFs non uniform public disclosure standards – the 
European Parliament did not recommended the adoption of ad-hoc statutory legal 
provisions, but rather called on the Commission to take part in the IMF initiative 
to establish a working group to draft an international code of conduct for SWFs, 
                                                 
138 E.g. money laundering, transparency of voting policies, a system of EU-wide shareholder identification, 
“managers” remuneration systems, unreasonable “plundering” of (or so-called “asset stripping” in) target 
companies by investors and, in general, any possible misuse of investors’ financial power in a way that 
merely disadvantages the company acquired in the long term, without having any positive impact on the 
company's future and the interest of its employees, creditors and business partners. 




10.  Current “hard law” legal instruments to control capital flows 
originating from SWFs under the acquis communautaire 
  As also suggested by the EU Commission, adoption of SWFs direct and 
specific statutory regulation is also discouraged by SWFs being not actually 
operating “in a legal vacuum“ in the EU; rather they have “to comply with the 
same EU and national economic and social legislation that any other investors 
have to respect”
139. In addition, WTO and OECD rules as well as the EC Treaty 
and antitrust legislation already provide for a broad array of waivers and 
exception to the free movement of capital and goods whereby “public security” 
and other “legitimate national interests” are at stake. 
  For instance, the mentioned prohibitions to all restrictions "on the 
movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and 
third countries" and "on payments between Member States and between Member 
States and third countries" provided for by Art. 56 of EC Treaty are not absolute – 
both specific and general exemptions apply (as summarised in the chart below)
140. 
                                                 
139 European Commission (2008), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A common 
European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds”, COM (2008) 115 final, 27.2.2008, par. 3.1. 
140 
See also: European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, (2003), The 
EU economy: 2003 review, (Annex: Capital movements in the legal framework of the Community), 2003, 
No 6, p. 322. 
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10.1. Third Country restrictions (specific exemptions) 
 
  Pursuant to Article 57.1 of the EC Treaty, Article 56 provisions shall be 
without prejudice to the application to third countries of any restrictions which 
exist on 31 December 1993 under national or Community law adopted in respect 
of the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment 
– including in real estate – establishment, the provision of financial services or the 
admission of securities to capital markets. 
  Under Art. 57.2 of the EC Treaty, whilst endeavouring to achieve the 
objective of free movement of capital between EU Member States and third 
countries to the greatest extent possible and without prejudice to the other 
chapters of the  Treaty,  the Council may, acting by a qualified majority upon 
Commission proposal, adopt measures on the movement of capital to or from 
third countries involving direct investment – also in real estate – establishment, 
the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital 
markets. Unanimity shall be required for measures under this paragraph, which 
constitute a step back in Community law with regard to liberalisation of the 
movement of capital to or from third countries. 
  In addition, EU Member States are allowed, under certain conditions, to 
apply restrictions on the movement of capital for the purpose of: 
  54o  applying a tax differentiation between taxpayers who are not in the 
same situation as to their place of residence or with regard to the place 
where their capital is invested; 
o  applying all necessary prudential and anti-elusive measures to prevent 
infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field 
of taxation and prudential supervision of financial institutions; 
o  laying down procedures for declaration of capital movements for 
purposes of administrative or statistical information; 
o  imposing restrictions on the right of establishment of natural persons 
and corporations, compatible with the EC Treaty (Arts. 45-48); 
o  taking measures justified on grounds of public policy or public 
security. However, according to the consolidated Court of Justice 
jurisprudence “the requirements of public security, as derogation from 
the fundamental principle of free movement of capital, must be 
interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined 
unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the 
Community institutions. Thus, public security may be relied on only if 
there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental 
interest of society”
141.  
  Finally a single Member State may, only for serious political reasons and 
on grounds of urgency, take unilateral (and temporarily) measures against a third 
country with regard to capital movements and payments, whereby an action by the 
Community to interrupt or reduce, partially or totally, economic relations with one 
or more third countries is provided in accordance with the EC Treaty provisions 
related to common foreign and security policy, and the Council has not yet taken 
the necessary urgent measures with regard to the third countries concerned (Art. 
60 EC Treaty). 
 
10.2. Third Country restrictions (general exemptions) 
 
  Possible restrictions to the free movement of capital, in principle also 
applicable to SWFs, could legitimately result from: 
o  national rules governing the system of property ownership (Art. 295 
EC Treaty); 
                                                 
141 Case C-503/99, Judgment of the Court of 4 June 2002, Commission of the European Communities v 
Kingdom of Belgium. 
  55o  the need to protect privileged information, the disclosure of which is 
considered by a Member State contrary to the essential interests of its 
security (Art. 296.1 (a) EC Treaty); 
o  measures that a Member State considers necessary for protection of the 
essential interests of its security connected with production of or trade 
in arms, munitions and war materials. 
Such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition 
in the common market  as to products not specifically intended for 
military purposes (i.e. no spill-over effect). 
  Apart from the mentioned EC Treaty provisions, while investing in the 
EU, SWFs are in principle subject to laws and regulations applicable to any other 
type of investor. 
  Among the rules most likely to affect SWFs investments, EU and national 
"antitrust provisions" represent other instruments currently available to tackle 
issues related to possible political/strategic motives of SWF equity investments. 
  Indeed, both the EU and Member State "antitrust provisions" acknowledge 
the possible relevance of "public security", "national defence" and other national 
interests. 
  For example, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
on control of “concentrations” between undertakings provides that (Art. 21) EU 
Member States may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other 
than those taken into consideration by the same Regulation and compatible with 
the general principles and other provisions of Community law. 
  In this respect, public security, media plurality and prudential rules are 
regarded as legitimate interests per se. 
Any other public interest must be instead recognised by the Commission 
(following assessment of its compatibility with the general principles and other 
provisions of Community law) before the relevant measures may be taken. 
A concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a 
lasting basis results from: 
o  the  merger  of two or more previously independent undertakings or 
parts of undertakings, or 
o  the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of 
securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or 
indirect control  of the whole or parts of one or more other 
undertakings. 
  56Control is constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either 
separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law 
involved, confer  the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an 
undertaking, in particular by: 
o  ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; 
o  rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, 
voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking. 
For instance, not only does the Italian antitrust law entitle the government 
to exceptionally authorise concentration with anti-competitive effects due to 
“national economy general interests”, but it also provides that whereby non-
cooperative or discriminating States are involved, the Prime Minister may prohibit 
a concentration to occur on the grounds of “national economy” interests.  
 
10.3.  Shareholdings’  disclosure requirements and provisions 
affecting the exercise of shareholders’ voting rights 
 
Going back to the issues related to SWFs being deemed as not sufficiently 
transparent and the suspicion that their investments may be not only motivated by 
profit-seeking
142, possible limitations to general freedom of capital movement and 
payments are to be regarded as last resort solutions to tackle the concerns 
expressed in international fora as to possible strategic/political motives of SWFs 
equity investments in EU companies
143. 
                                                 
142 For example, according to the authors of a recent study on foreign equity investments by sovereign wealth 
funds, “SWFs when investing abroad tend to invest in countries that share the same religion and in different 
industries than those found at home, suggesting that SWFs tend to look for industry-specific diversification 
but while doing so bias their investments to similar cultures. The latter investment rule clearly is strictly 
speaking not consistent with pure profit maximizing objectives”, Chhaochharia V. and Laeven L., (2008), 
“Sovereign wealth funds: Their investment strategies and performance”, University of Miami and 
International Monetary Fund, working paper, August 31, 2008, 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262383), p. 2. 
143 With reference to policy measures intended to address national security concerns that arise in the general 
context of foreign investments as well as in the specific context of investments from SWFs, participants in the 
OECD’s project on “Freedom of Investment, National Security and ‘Strategic Industries’” have recently 
agreed that, in line with a proportionality principle, “restrictions on investment, or conditions on transaction, 
should not be greater than needed to protect national security and they should be avoided when other existing 
measures are adequate and appropriate to address a national security concern”, in particular, “restrictive 
investment measures should be used, if at all, as a last resort when other policies (e.g. sectoral licensing, 
competition policy, financial market regulations) cannot be used to eliminate security-related concerns”. 
OECD Investment Committee, (2008), Report on “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies”, 
4 April 2008, p. 5. 
  57A more “SWF-friendly” and indirect regulation of SWFs equity 
investments might be based instead on other harmonised sets of principles and 
legal provisions already in force in most EU Member States, in particular on those 
providing for shareholdings and voting rights transparency and disclosure 
regimes, as well as on those imposing possible limits on shareholdings and/or the 
exercise of voting rights by EU companies’ shareholders. 
For instance, with reference to the lack of transparency on SWFs equity 
holdings, it is worth noting that non-listed EU companies are usually required 
(under Member States’ company laws) to regularly file to the competent 
Company Register the list of their shareholders. A more burdensome and 
comprehensive disclosure regime is instead provided for in case of qualifying and 
major holdings in listed companies, companies issuing equity- like instruments, 
companies with financial instruments widely distributed among the public and 
regulated firms (e.g. banks, insurances, investment firms, mutual funds, etc.). 
A specific disclosure regime is also typically provided for by EU 
Securities Laws with reference to: 
o  Shareholders' agreements  (i.e. agreements, in whatsoever form 
concluded, whose object is the exercise of voting rights in companies 
with listed shares or companies controlling them), and 
o  Agreements that: create obligations of consultation prior to the 
exercise of voting rights in companies with listed shares or companies 
controlling them; set limits on the transfer of the related shares or of 
financial instruments entitling holders to buy or subscribe for them; 
provide for the purchase of shares or financial instruments; have as 
their object or effect the exercise, jointly or otherwise, of a dominant 
influence on such companies; aim to encourage or frustrate a takeover 
bid or equity swap. 
In the event of non-compliance with the relevant disclosure requirements, 
it is usually provided that: 
o  Voting rights attached to listed shares or to financial instruments not 
properly notified may not be exercised; 
o  Agreements shall be null and void.  
Moreover, also considering that the financial sector has been mostly 
alluring for SWFs equity investments, it is worth noting that in the EU a specific 
harmonised legal framework governs “acquisitions and increase of holdings in the 
financial sector” (Directive 2007/44/EC) providing for a transparency and 
disclosure regime as well as an ex-ante authorisation regime by the competent 
national authorities. 
  58For example, whereby the influence exercised by a qualifying shareholder 
is likely to operate to the detriment of the sound and prudent management of a 
credit institution  (e.g. whereby risk of exploitation/expropriation exists)  the 
relevant authority may impose suspension of the exercise of the voting rights 
(Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2007/44/EC). 
Suspension of the corresponding voting rights, or nullity of votes cast, or 
possibility of obtaining their annulment is also provided whereby a holding in a 
credit institution is acquired in spite of the competent supervisory authorities’ 
opposition. While assessing the request for authorisation, the competent 
authorities must not examine the proposed acquisition in terms of the “economic 
needs of the market”; instead, they must appraise (only) the “suitability of the 
proposed acquirer” and the “financial soundness of the proposed acquisition” – in 
order to ensure the “sound and prudent management” of the financial institution in 
which the acquisition is proposed and taking into account the likely influence of 
the proposed acquirer on the financial institution – against all of the following 
criteria: 
o  Reputation of the proposed acquirer;  
o  Reputation and experience of any person who will direct the business 
of the insurance undertaking as a result of the proposed acquisition;  
o  Financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, notably as to the type of 
business pursued and envisaged in the financial institution in which the 
acquisition is proposed; 
o  Whether the financial institution will be able to comply and continue 
to comply with the relevant prudential requirements – notably, whether 
the group it will partake has a structure enabling effective supervision, 
effectively exchange information among the competent authorities and 
determine responsibilities allocation among them; 
o  Whether reasonable grounds exist to suspect that, in connection with 
the proposed acquisition, money laundering or terrorist financing 
within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 2005/60/EC is being or 
has been committed or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition 
could increase the risk thereof. 
As a result, following the above legal principles and provisions, strategic 
and politically biased acquisitions by SWFs of shareholdings in the EU financial 
sector may already be limited or prohibited whereby such acquisitions are not 
likely to ensure the “sound and prudent management” of the concerned financial 
institution. 
At a more general level it is worth noting that, under the main assumption 
that SWFs influence on portfolio companies essentially depends on their “ability 
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exercise of voting rights attached to SWFs strategic shareholdings or to SWFs 
shareholdings above a certain threshold might be regarded as a useful tool to offer 
a more market-friendly and proportionate solution (if compared with other 
protectionist measures resulting in direct or indirect limitations to the general 
freedom of capital movement and payments) so as to mitigate risks and ease 
concerns associated with SWFs equity investments’ strategic/political motive (i.e. 
portfolio companies exploitation due to SWFs strategic behaviour and SWFs 
influence on portfolio companies benefiting its sovereign beneficial owner in 
ways not proportionally benefiting or not accessible to other shareholders). 
As pointed out by two academics (Gilson R. J. and Milhaupt C. J.)
144, vote 
suspension/sterilisation mechanism (a mechanism mirroring the "break through" 
rule
145 provided by the EU Takeover Directive) might indeed represent a tool to 
constrain potential strategic/politically biased investments but leave “genuine” 
SWFs (equity) investments – and their important economic benefits – almost 
unaffected. 
 
  Nevertheless, it is fair to assume and assert that the limitation/suspension 
of voting rights is far from being a flawless solution. As a matter of fact: 
o  It would reduce the value of the affected shares, thus the incentives to 
invest (GAAP Principle No 21 clearly states that “SWFs view 
shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity 
investments’ value”); 
o  It would result in a protectionist restriction to foreign direct 
investments with a negative impact also on the attractiveness of the 
relevant capital market (as also noted by the U.S. Treasury Assistant 
Secretary for International Affairs
146); 
o  SWFs and explicit/formal use of voting rights are not the only tools 
governments can use to influence the business decisions of a foreign 
                                                 
144 Gilson R. J. and Milhaupt C. J., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds and corporate governance: a minimalist 
response to the new merchantilism, (February 18, 2008). Stanford University Law and Economics Olin Paper 
No 355 and Columbia University Law and Economics Olin Paper No 328, p. 1. 
145 The “break through” rule provides that shareholder voting restrictions provided by corporate charter, 
contracts or different shareholders’ agreements do not apply whereby the offeror has gained 75% of the 
shares of the target company, see: Papadopoulos T. , (2007), The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover 
Bid Directive and Their Deficiencies. Law and Financial Markets Review-LFMR, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 525-533, 
November 2007(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088894); Papadopoulos T. , (2008), Legal Aspects of the 
Breakthrough Rule of the European Takeover Bid Directive. Takeover Regulation: A Legal Approach, Icfai 
Books, Icfai University Press (IUP), Icfai University, 2008 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114671). 
146 In particular “there are those who say that sovereign wealth funds should not be allowed to vote their 
shares when they take a non-controlling stake in a U.S. company. I think this goes too far. Most – but not all 
– classes of equity securities allow their owner to vote on major matters of corporate policy and the board of 
directors. That is one of the most fundamental rights of ownership in U.S. corporations. It is integral to the 
vitality and attractiveness of our capital markets”, Remarks by Treasury Assistant Secretary for International 
Affairs Clay Lowery at Barclays Capital’s 12th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference, (hp-836), 
February 25, 2008. 
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strategic advantage (others could be the granting of license, acquisition 
of bonds and other debt securities, guarantees, “check-book 
diplomacy”, etc.); 
o  Benefits arising from (actual or potential) institutional shareholders’ 
activism are lost or significantly reduced. 
  Moreover, the limitation/suspension of voting rights would pose the 
critical problem of how legitimate SWFs equity investments/capital injections in a 
company can be properly distinguished from political/strategic biased 
investments.  
As a result, mandatory or voluntary measures (see GAAP Principle No 21) 
“merely” providing for disclosure of SWFs shareholdings, voting policies and 
voting records should be preferred, in the first instance, to the possible suspension 
of SWFs voting rights. 
Indeed, as the decision on whether to vote their own shares should be left 
in principle to SWFs, disclosure of SWFs voting policies and voting records – by 
allowing for public monitoring of SWFs behaviour as shareholders
147 – is deemed 
to effectively and proportionately “mitigate concerns about real or perceived 
conflicts between economic and political interests that can arise with large cross-
border government investment vehicles like SWFs. Experience with mutual funds 




10.4.    How to asses SWF equity investment motives: “Market 
Economy Investor” legal test. 
So as to properly distinguish between a legitimate SWFs shareholding in a 
company and politically biased investments, reference could be made to the so-
called “private investor test” adopted by the EU Commission to enforce the EC 
Treaty provisions on "State Aid".  
For the above test to be fulfilled, it is necessary to demonstrate that a 
private investor, whose purpose is long-run profit, would have acted as the State 
(in our case a SWF) did in its shareholder capacity. 
                                                 
147 Keller A. D., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles of Strategic Ambition? 
(September 11, 2008), Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264349), p. 66. 
148 See: Remarks by Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery at Barclays Capital’s 
12th Annual Global Inflation-Linked Conference, (hp-836), February 25, 2008. 
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reasonably be supposed that there will be a normal return on the State’s 
investment in the whole operation which would be acceptable to a private investor 
in a market economy. Otherwise, there is a State aid component". In particular, in 
case of a public holding in a company’s capital, it is necessary to establish 
whether the public holding “is intended to earn a return, and has consequently 
been acquired by the State or public holding corporation in the same way as it 
might have been acquired by a private buyer, or whether it has been acquired in 
the public interest, so that the acquisition has to be considered a form of assistance 
by the State in its capacity as public authority. When public capital is to be 
injected into a business, the question arises whether a private investor would do 
the same. The test is satisfied where the capital invested can be expected to 
produce a normal return on the investment in the form of dividends or capital 
gains"
149. 
In this respect, so as to avoid problems related to possibly erratic scrutiny, 
by third-party subjects (e.g. foreign authority), of the underlying motive of SWF 
equity investments: 
o  A general shareholding threshold to SWFs investments could be set; 
o  SWFs could consider to self-enforce the voting suspension on their 
shareholdings (or consciously restrict their equity investments to purchase 
of “non-voting” shares, as with the 2007 China CIC investment in 
Blackstone)
150; 
o  SWFs could consider irrevocably delegating their voting powers to a 
trustee or third-party asset managers that will vote compliantly with 
predefined and disclosed guidelines (e.g. California Public Employees 
Retirement System – CalPERS – discloses “information about how 
CalPERS will vote its portfolio securities, and whether CalPERS has 
engaged in discussions with company management"
151). 
  As a result: 
o  SWFs only interested in strategic holdings will have lower incentives to 
invest; 
                                                 
149 EU Commission XXX Report on Competition Policy 2000, par. 304. 
150 As reported, “on May 20, 2007, China Jianyin Investment Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
Central Huijin Investment Company (CHIC), signed an agreement to purchase a less than 10% stake in 
Blackstone Group in non-voting shares worth $3 billion. The decision to purchase less than 10% of 
Blackstone’s shares, and to purchase non-voting shares, was apparently not an arbitrary one. According to 
Blackstone’s CEO and Chairman Stephen A. Schwarzman, “The deal is ‘purely commercial’ and do [sic] not 
need the U.S. government approval as the stake is less than 10 percent”, Martin M. F., (2008), China’s 
Sovereign Wealth Fund, CSR Report for Congress, January 22, 2008, p. 8. 
151 Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks to the Investment Company Institute Procedures Conference by 
Paul R. Carey Commissioner, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, December 9, 1999. 
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(completely) deterred. 
That said, limitation or suspension of the voting rights of SWFs strategic 
holdings is far from being a perfect solution to issues and concerns raised by 
SWFs equity investments. It could rather be regarded as a mere tool to 
(temporarily) reduce risks of protectionist backlash from recipient countries, and 
adoption of defensive measures by target companies. The absence of a 
protectionist response will probably “allow the global markets to demonstrate 
that, in the long run, governments make ineffective capitalists, especially where 
innovation is the ultimate currency. Buying time to allow the competition between 
the two systems of capitalism to work itself out is no small matter” (Gilson R. J. 
and Milhaupt C. J. - 2008)
152. 
Moreover, the expected progressive unwinding of global imbalances 
would meanwhile probably lead to a decrease in both size and number of SWFs, 
thus automatically reducing the importance and relevance of related issues.  
Nevertheless – also considering the negative “side effects” of possible 
SWFs voting rights suspension, confirmed by GAAP Principle No 21 stating that 
“SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their 
equity investments’ value” – mandatory or voluntary disclosure of SWFs 
shareholdings, voting policies and voting records should be regarded as the “first-




11. The EU approach to SWFs and complementary “soft law” 
measures: “Santiago Principles” and OECD “legal” instruments. 
 
As mentioned, as any other foreign investors, SWFs are already subject to 
a comprehensive set of rules governing foreign investors’ operations, both at 
international and European level. Nevertheless, the political and economic 
implications of large cross-border investments by state-owned investors such as 
SWFs and related new focus on improved SWFs transparency and governance has 
sparked a harsh public debate among both SWFs owners and recipient countries 
on whether a proper “hard” regulatory regime for SWFs investments should be 
introduced. 
                                                 
152 Gilson R. J. and Milhaupt C. J., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds and corporate governance: a minimalist 
response to the new merchantilism, (February 18, 2008). Stanford University Law and Economics Olin Paper 
No 355 and Columbia University Law and Economics Olin Paper No 328, p. 31. 
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“laissez-faire” positions to requests for protectionist measures. 
In particular, the policy endorsed by the EU institutions aims “to promote 
a cooperative effort between recipient countries and SWFs and their sponsor 
countries to establish a set of principles ensuring the transparency, predictability 
and accountability of SWFs investments”, primarily by supporting and 
contributing to the efforts already undertaken at international level – e.g. by the 
IMF in order to design a code of conduct for SWFs and their sponsor countries, 
and by the OECD in order to identify best practices and principles expected to be 
applied by recipient countries when dealing with SWFs
153. 
In this respect, from the EU Commission point of view a balanced and 
proportionate approach to SWFs treatment as investors should be based on the 
following principles: i)  commitment to an open investment environment for 
foreign capital and investor-friendly investment climate, in line with the Lisbon 
Strategy for growth and jobs (any protectionist move may trigger a spiral of 
protectionism, negatively affecting both global growth and the EU economy); ii) 
support to multilateral work carried out by international organisations, in 
particular IMF and OECD; iii) use of existing legal instruments currently allowing 
the EU and Member States to formulate appropriate responses to risks or 
challenges raised by cross-border investments for “public policy” and “public 
security” reasons; iv)  respect of EC Treaty obligations and EU international 
commitments; v) proportionality and transparency of any possible measures and 
rules taken on foreign investments for (national) “public interest” reasons. 
As a result, the EU approach to SWFs issues appears to be broadly 
compatible with the “two-layer regulatory approach” to SWFs of “self-regulation 
within a statutory framework” herein proposed. Indeed, the position formally 
endorsed by the EU institutions appears to confirm the idea hereby suggested that 
most of the issues raised by SWFs (namely, misallocation of resources due to their 
lack of transparency, suspicions and uncertainty surrounding their strategies and 
investment motives) may be more efficiently tackled by market participants 
themselves through development of reasonable and appropriate “soft law” 
measures (i.e. voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines and best practices for SWFs 
and recipient countries), if necessary complemented with a “light” regulatory 
intervention aimed (and limited), at least in the first instance, at minimising 
transaction and “bargaining” costs between SWFs (interested in secure and liberal 
access to industrial-country markets for their capital) and other stakeholders 
(concerned about SWFs objectives and operations). 
Indeed, as correctly pointed out, the collaborative process established to 
identify and draft the “Santiago Principles” indicates that “the growing trade and 
                                                 
153 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A common European approach to Sovereign 
Wealth Funds”, COM (2008) 115 final, 27.2.2008, par. 4.1; European Parliament resolution of 23 September 
2008 with recommendations to the Commission on transparency of institutional investors (2007/2239(INI). 
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promote responsible economic behavior than to entice mayhem. Investment is 
about creating wealth, not destroying it”
154. 
Of course, whereby a conflict of interests, rather than mutual interest, 
arises between the parties involved, efficiency increase may result in wealth 
transfer from one group of “market participants” to others – thus the party 
benefiting from inefficiency (e.g. a SWF taking advantage of privileged 
information by the sponsor government while competing with private 
undertakings and/or benefit from private interests in portfolio companies by using 
their voting rights or through other means, or a recipient country trying to protect 
its “national champions” or other local interests) does not have strong incentive to 
change the situation. As a result, voluntary or “soft law” instruments alone are not 
likely to ensure efficient outcome, thus making a (EU harmonised) formal 
regulatory intervention more desirable.  
As said, the international debate on SWFs essentially revolved around the 
lack of transparency of SWFs investments and operations and possible 
strategic/political bias in SWFs operation. In order to ease the related concerns, 
two key aspects – also standing at the core of the EU approach to SWFs – are 
expected to be addressed, primarily by SWFs and their sponsor countries: i) 
adoption of appropriate SWFs governance structure (guaranteeing, inter alia, 
clear division of rights and responsibilities between sponsoring governments and 
SWF managers); ii) delivery of greater transparency (on their activities, 
investments, AUM value, investment objectives and strategies, target portfolio 
allocations, risk management systems, and internal controls)
155. 
In this respect, according to the EU Commission, principles of good 
governance should include: i) clear allocation and separation of responsibilities in 
SWF internal governance structure; ii) development and issuance of an investment 
policy defining the overall objectives of SWF investment; iii) operational 
autonomy for the entity to achieve its defined objectives; iv) public disclosure of 
the general principles governing SWFs interaction with governmental authority; 
v) disclosure of the internal governance general principles providing for integrity 
assurance; and vi) development and issuance of risk-management policies. 
                                                 
154 Markheim D., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Voluntary Principles a Step in the Right Direction, 
Center for International Trade and Economics (CITE), The Heritage Foundation, Web memo, No. 2175, 
December 18, 2008, p. 3. 
155 In the opinion of the EU Commission “clarity about the degree of possible political interference in the 
operation of a SWF is a prerequisite for addressing concerns about the existence of political and other non-
commercial considerations in the operation of a fund”, while “transparency provides a disciplinary effect on 
the management of sovereign assets, as relevant stakeholders can exercise some degree of oversight on the 
activities of investors, and monitor whether or not funds deviate from their stated objectives. As such, 
transparency promotes accountability. In the case of SWFs, transparency not only serves to foster market 
discipline, but also reduces the incentives for any government intervention. It is therefore a critical factor in 
offering the confidence that underlies an open investment environment”, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, “A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds”, COM (2008) 115 
final, 27.2.2008, par. 4.3 
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consideration: i) annual disclosure of investment positions and asset allocation, in 
particular for majority ownership investments; ii) exercise of ownership rights; iii) 
disclosure of leverage use and currency composition; iv) size and source of 
entity's resources; v) disclosure of the home country regulation and oversight 
governing SWFs. 
Considering that – as also recognised by EU institutions – multilateral 
solutions and multilateral agreements on SWFs are to be preferred to unilateral 
actions
156, significant steps have been already taken at international level to better 
understand the SWFs phenomenon and properly address related challenges and 
issues. In particular, on the occasion of the meeting held in Washington in 
October 2007, the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
157 agreed, 
among other things, that “sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are increasingly 
important participants in the international financial system and that our economies 
can benefit from openness to SWF investment flows” and thus requested the IMF, 
the World Bank and the OECD to examine the following main issues: 
identification of possible “best practices for SWFs in areas such as institutional 
structure, risk management, transparency and accountability” and the importance 
for “recipients of government-controlled investments […] to build on principles 
such as non-discrimination, transparency, and predictability”
158. A G-7 outreach 
dinner with Finance Ministers and Heads of SWFs from China, Korea, Kuwait, 
Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates was 
consequently hosted to build up support for a set of SWFs best practices. 
Following the recommendations endorsed by the G-7, the IMF (rightly) 
decided not to take unilateral actions, but instead to closely cooperate with the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF) – 
established on 30 April-1 May 2008 in Washington D.C. and comprising 26 IMF 
member countries with SWFs – in order to develop a voluntary code of conduct 
for SWFs. A preliminary survey of SWFs current institutional and operational 
practices was therefore conducted, soliciting responses on a voluntary and 
confidential basis from IWG-SWF members
159. 
                                                 
156 Indeed as noted “unilateral action has at least three problems. First, unilateral action could easily acquire a 
protectionist slant, especially if protectionists articulate their concerns in the language of national security as 
happened in the aborted acquisition effort by Dubai Ports World and in the case of the Chinese national oil 
company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Second, there could be proliferating and 
hence highly heterogeneous standards imposed by different capital-receiving governments, which could 
impose undue costs of compliance on SWFs and hence affect the efficient flow of capital. Third, even where 
unilateral legislation is enlightened and uniform and takes the form of stipulating reasonable restrictions on 
SWFs in return for secure access, there are likely to be difficulties in monitoring compliance with these 
restrictions unilaterally or even bilaterally”, Mattoo A. and Subramanian A., (2008), Currency 
Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Working Paper Series 08-02, January 2008, p. 16. 
157 Members of G-7 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. 
158 Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington, October 19, 2007. 
159 See: IWG Secretariat in collaboration with the Members of the IWG, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Current 
Institutional and Operational Practices, September 15, 2008, p. 4. 
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adopt (October 2008) a set of 24 Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
(GAPP) – a.k.a. “Santiago Principles” – that IWG-SWF members agreed to 
follow on a voluntary basis (Box 1).  
The IWG benefited not only from the mixed interest represented by its 
members but also from the input from a number of SWFs investments recipient 
countries (i.e. Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, 
South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as well as from 
the European Commission (acting on behalf of the European Union, as agreed by 
the European Council on 14 March 2008), the OECD, and the World Bank
160. 
 
Box 1 – Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) –  
Santiago Principles (October 2008) 
GAPP 1. Principle: The legal framework 
for the SWF should be sound, and support 
its effective operation and the achievement 
of its stated objective(s). 
GAPP 1.1 Subprinciple The legal 
framework for the SWF should ensure 
the legal soundness of the SWF and its 
transactions. 
GAPP 1.2 Subprinciple The key features 
of the SWF's legal basis and structure, as 
well as the legal relationship between the 
SWF and the other state bodies, should 
be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 2. Principle: The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and 
publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 3. Principle: Where the SWF's activities have significant direct domestic 
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the 
domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency with the overall 
macroeconomic policies. 
GAPP 4. Principle: There should be clear 
and publicly disclosed policies, rules, 
procedures, or arrangements in relation to 
the SWF's general approach to funding, 
withdrawal, and spending operations 
GAPP 4.1 Subprinciple The source of 
SWF funding should be publicly 
disclosed. 
GAPP 4.2 Subprinciple The general 
approach to withdrawals from the SWF 
and spending on behalf of the 
government should be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 5. Principle: The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be 
reported on a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where 
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets. 
                                                 
160 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds, Generally 
Accepted Principles and Practices. “Santiago Principles”, October 2008, p. 2. 
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GAPP 6. Principle: The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and 
establish a clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate 
accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF to pursue 
its objectives.  
GAPP 7. Principle: The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the 
members of its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and 
exercise oversight over the SWF's operations.  
GAPP 8. Principle: The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the 
SWF, and have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its 
functions. 
GAPP 9. Principle: The operational management of the SWF should implement the 
SWF’s strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined 
responsibilities 
GAPP 10. Principle: The accountability framework for the SWF's operations should 
be clearly defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or 
management agreement. 
GAPP 11. Principle: An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the 
SWF's operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in 
accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards in a 
consistent manner. 
GAPP 12. Principle: The SWF's operations and financial statements should be audited 
annually in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in a 
consistent manner 
GAPP 13. Principle: Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and 
made known to the members of the SWF's governing body(ies), management, and 
staff. 
GAPP 14. Principle: Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF's 
operational management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and 
follow clear rules and procedures. 
GAPP 15. Principle: SWF operations and activities in host countries should be 
conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of 
the countries in which they operate. 
GAPP 16. Principle: The governance framework and objectives, as well as the 
manner in which the SWF's management is operationally independent from the owner, 
should be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 17. Principle: Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be 
publicly disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to 
contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient 
countries. 
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GAPP 18. Principle: The SWF's 
investment policy should be clear and 
consistent with its defined objectives, risk 
tolerance, and investment strategy, as set 
by the owner or the governing body(ies), 
and be based on sound portfolio 
management principles. 
GAPP 18.1 Subprinciple The investment 
policy should guide the SWF's financial 
risk exposures and the possible use of 
leverage. 
GAPP 18.2 Subprinciple The investment 
policy should address the extent to which 
internal and/or external investment 
managers are used, the range of their 
activities and authority, and the process 
by which they are selected and their 
performance monitored. 
GAPP 18.3 Subprinciple A description of 
the investment policy of the SWF should 
be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 19. Principle: The SWF's 
investment decisions should aim to 
maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in 
a manner consistent with its investment 
policy, and based on economic and 
financial grounds. 
GAPP 19.1 Subprinciple If investment 
decisions are subject to other than 
economic and financial considerations, 
these should be clearly set out in the 
investment policy and be publicly 
disclosed. 
GAPP 19.2 Subprinciple The 
management of an SWF’s assets should 
be consistent with what is generally 
accepted as sound asset management 
principles. 
GAPP 20. Principle: The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged 
information or inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with 
private entities.  
GAPP 21. Principle: SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental 
element of their equity investments' value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership 
rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and 
protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should publicly disclose its 
general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key factors 
guiding its exercise of ownership rights. 
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GAPP 22. Principle: The SWF should 
have a framework that identifies, assesses, 
and manages the risks of its operations. 
GAPP 22.1 Subprinciple The risk 
management framework should include 
reliable information and timely reporting 
systems, which should enable the 
adequate monitoring and management of 
relevant risks within acceptable 
parameters and levels, control and 
incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, 
business continuity planning, and an 
independent audit function. 
GAPP 22.2 Subprinciple The general 
approach to the SWF’s risk management 
framework should be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 23. Principle: The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to 
benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the owner 
according to clearly defined principles or standards. 
GAPP 24. Principle: A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP 
should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF. 
 
GAPP adoption is intended to support SWFs sponsor countries to better 
structure and manage their SWFs and promote market confidence, which in turn 
may help counteract the move toward the adoption of protectionist barriers to 
SWFs investments. As noticed, “although the current financial crisis has given 
SWFs a boost in popularity – these days nations are happy to get capital from any 
source – the implementation of GAPP practices should help prevent a return to the 
hostile investment environment of the recent past”
161. 
In particular, the “Santiago Principles” – each subject to home country 
laws, regulations, requirements and obligations – essentially lay down a voluntary 
framework providing guidance to improve SWFs governance structure (primarily 
through clear separation between fund management and sponsor country 
government),  investment policies and decisions (through commitment to 
implement investment policies based on economic and financial grounds, and not 
on political considerations, and make “proper” use of voting rights attached to 
SWFs shareholdings), risk management, disclosure and accountability. 
As a result, according to the IMF, they are expected to “contribute to 
reducing concerns about these types of funds that could lead to counterproductive 
restrictions on such inflows […while on the other hand…] guidelines for recipient 
countries, which are under development at the Organization for Economic 
                                                 
161 Markheim D., (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Voluntary Principles a Step in the Right Direction, 
Centre for International Trade and Economics (CITE), The Heritage Foundation, Web memo, No. 2175, 
December 18, 2008. 
  70Cooperation and Development, would help reassure the SWFs of fair, transparent, 
and open access to markets”
162. 
The content of the “Santiago Principles” is broadly sharable and indeed 
their assessment has been widely positive; nevertheless few important issues still 
stand out. Also due to its voluntary nature, a possible weakness of the “Santiago 
framework” could be primarily identified in the absence of proper enforcement 
and implementation mechanisms and in the related risk that its principles and 
commitments could turn out to be ineffective
163. As a result, SWFs might 
“continue to face difficulties finding access to certain economies and being 
accepted as reliable institutional investors”
164. 
In other words, “if committing to the GAPP were to develop into a seal of 
quality, SWFs would need to back up their commitment with action. They should 
adhere to financial objectives and implement and apply transparency and 
governance standards in a way that can actually be monitored by all 
stakeholders”
165, and above all by the competent authorities in recipient countries. 
In this respect a significant example was provided by recent institutional 
developments in Italy where an Interministerial Strategic Committee was 
established in July 2008 (i.e. “Comitato Strategico per lo Sviluppo e la Tutela 
all’Estero degli Interessi Nazionali in Economia”, literally: “Strategic Committee 
for Development and Protection Abroad of Economic National Interests”) 
entrusted, inter alia, with the function of advising the government and devising 
policies on foreign investments and SWFs, manly in order “to promote useful 
investments and prevent dangerous ones”. 
Indeed Italy has been the first EU Member State to officially endorse the 
“Santiago Principles”, conferring them a quasi-regulatory nature and function. For 
the specific purpose of distinguishing SWFs “to be encouraged (which is the case 
of the United Arab Emirates) from those to regard with caution”
166 – in other 
words to provide a sort of “approval stamp” to SWFs interested in investing in 
Italy – it was formally stated that reference would be made to actual compliance 
of the relevant SWF with the “Santiago Principles” approved by the IWG. That 
                                                 
162 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries, World Economic 
Outlook, October 2008, p. XX. 
163 Anyhow it has been argued that “these principles are not a set of ideals that SWFs will struggle to reach, 
but an inventory of best practices that already exist. This means that the GAPP do not require SWFs to do 
anything that is not already being done by at least one other SWF. It should therefore be harder for SWFs to 
argue that they cannot live up to the GAPP’s standards of accountability and transparency. Now that SWFs 
have signed up to the GAPP, there may even be a process of competitive emulation”, Barysch K., Tilford S. 
and Whyte P., (2008), State, money and rules: An EU policy for sovereign investments, Centre for European 
reform essay, December 2008, p. 14. 
164 Kern S., (2008b), Control mechanisms for sovereign wealth funds in selected countries, CESifo DICE 
Report, No 4/2008, p. 47. 
165 Ibidem, p. 47. 
166 Cifoni L., (2008), Intervista al Ministro Frattini: “I Fondi sovrani non superano quota 5%” (Interview with 
Minister Frattini: “Sovereign Wealth Funds no higher than 5%”), Il Messaggero, 20 October 2008. 
  71said, additional criteria will be followed so as to tell the “welcomed” from the 
“unwanted” foreign investors. Guidelines so far formulated provide that those 
funds “that operate transparently, that aim at investing in and not controlling 
businesses and that, therefore, tend to stay at under 5%” will always be considered 
“trustworthy” investors. Assessment by the targeted industrial sector will be also 
carried out compliantly with the “Interministerial Strategic Committee” 
recommendations. It is however already evident that SWFs intervention would be 
deemed particularly beneficial in some specific sectors (i.e. infrastructure, 
transport and tourism) while in “sensitive sectors” (i.e. relevant for “national 
defence”) industrial cooperation agreements will be preferred to direct capital 
investment
167.  
Beside the efforts in developing guidelines and “soft law” principles for 
SWFs – following the mandate received by the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors (and other OECD members) and “as part of an ongoing project 
on Freedom of Investment and National Security, which was launched in view of 
the rise of investment protectionism and to maintain open markets”
168 – the 
OECD started working at the development of a set of harmonised principles, best 
practices and guidance for recipient countries’ policies towards investments from 
SWFs, essentially “to ensure that they are evaluated on an equal basis as other 
investments and to make sure that recipient countries’ policies do not create 
barriers to efficient flows of capital across borders”
169 or unnecessary limitations 
to market access. In this respect, it has been pointed out that “economies 
worldwide are separated from each other in terms of foreign investments by 
substantial regulatory barriers. […] The EU and its member states are, on average, 
the most open and liberal economies in the world, with Latvia, Belgium, 
Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania and France leading 
the field. Japan, the US and other industrial and emerging economies follow. 
Russia, India and China are the most restrictive countries. Paradoxically, a 
comparison of the degree of restrictiveness on foreign direct investments versus 
the volumes of sovereign assets at issue suggests that it is particularly countries 
with extensive stateowned funds at their disposal which currently maintain the 
strictest regimes when it comes to preventing foreign investment from entering 
their domestic markets”
 170. 
Although the OECD project is focused on host/recipient country policies 
and is independent from efforts undertaken to develop SWFs voluntary best 
practices, SWFs observance of high governance and transparency standards (i.e. 
“Santiago Principles”) is deemed to “facilitate recipient countries’ efforts to 
                                                 
167 Ibidem. 
168 OECD, Sovereign wealth funds and recipient country policies, Letter transmitting the Report of the OECD 
Investment Committee to G7 Finance Ministers, 4 April 2008.  
169 Paulson A. L., (2009), Raising capital: The role of sovereign wealth funds, Chicago Fed Letter, The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, January 2009, Number 258, pp. 3-4. 
170 Kern S., (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 
2008, pp. 20-21. 
  72implement their OECD commitments and its recommendations for preserving 
open markets while safeguarding national security”
171. 
The OECD final report of the “Freedom of Investment” Project (covering 
also SWFs investments) is expected to be released in Spring 2009. The resulting 
policy guidance will take the form of a menu of best practices consistent with 
existing OECD investment instruments (i.e. OECD Code of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements (1961) and OECD Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises (1976), as revised in 2000) and with the key 
principles of transparency and predictability, non discrimination, regulatory 
proportionality and accountability that should govern foreign investment policies 
designed by recipient countries to safeguard national security, as agreed by 
participants in OECD “Freedom of Investment, National Security and Strategic 
Industries” Project. 
In the meanwhile the OECD Investment Committee published an interim 
report on “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies”
172 based on a 
wide consultation with the thirty OECD countries, fourteen non-member countries 
participating in the project, the European Commission and SWFs. 
The OECD report acknowledges that SWFs have much to offer, not only 
to their sponsor countries (e.g. through better management of their foreign 
exchange assets and general contribution to economic development, 
macroeconomic stabilisation or inter-generational saving) but also to recipient 
countries, as confirmed by the stabilising effects of their capital injections into 
several OECD distressed financial institutions, their ability to recycle savings 
internationally, their track record as long-term investors, and the stimulating effect 
of their (foreign) investments on business activity and the job market. 
At the same time, the report underscores that “the growing role of SWFs 
raises issues regarding the smooth functioning of financial markets and they raise 
investment policy questions, including legitimate concerns in recipient countries 
about protecting national security”
173. 
In this respect, the OECD deems that the existing instruments on foreign 
investments – developed under the OECD acquis – already provide for adequate 
guidance and principles for recipient country policies, also as to SWFs 
                                                 
171 Ibidem.  
172  OECD Investment Committee, (2008), Report on “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country 
Policies”, 4 April 2008. 
173 In particular, “investments controlled by foreign governments, such as those by SWFs, can raise concerns 
based on uncertainty regarding the objectives of the investor and whether they are commercially based or 
driven by political or foreign policy considerations. They can raise concerns with respect to foreign 
government control or access to defence related technologies – for example, that such investments could 
provide a channel for the acquisition of dual-use technologies for military purposes by the acquiring country 
or for denying technology or other assets critical for national defence to the recipient government itself, or for 
aiding the intelligence capabilities of a foreign country that is hostile to the host country”, Ibidem, pp. 2-3 
and  4. 
  73investments. In particular, through their adherence to OECD investment 
instruments, the OECD and other adhering governments have committed to the 
following main principles designed to maintain open markets and preserve an 
open international investment system: i)  non discrimination (i.e. treat foreign 
investors not less favourably than domestic investors in like situations. “While the 
OECD instruments protect directly the investment freedoms of those SWFs 
established in OECD member countries, they also commit members to using their 
best endeavours to extend the benefits of liberalisation to all members of the 
International Monetary Fund”
174); ii) transparency and predictability (investment-
relevant laws should be public); iii)  progressive liberalisation (commitment 
towards a more open regime for capital movements); iv)  “standstill clause” 
(commitment to not introducing new restrictions); v) unilateral liberalisation or 
“no reciprocity” principle (as long as liberalisation is considered beneficial to all, 
especially for the country undertaking liberalisation, OECD members commit to 
not conditioning the application of their own liberalisation measures upon the 
liberalisation measures adopted by other countries). 
With specific reference to concerns as to whether the objectives of SWF 
investments are either commercial or driven by political, defence or foreign policy 
considerations, the OECD “Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements” (also 
covering direct investment and establishment) and “Code Of Liberalisation Of 
Current Invisible Operations” (covering services)
175 already acknowledge 
countries’ right to adopt measures to protect their national security. Indeed Article 
3 (“public order and security”) in both Codes provides that their provisions “shall 
not prevent a Member from taking action which it considers necessary for: i) the 
maintenance of public order or the protection of public health, morals and safety; 
ii) the protection of its essential security interests; or iii) the fulfilment of its 
obligations relating to international peace and security”. Nevertheless, as clarified, 
this “national security clause” should be applied with restraint, indeed possible 
“safeguard provisions relating in particular to public order and essential security 
interests are deemed to address exceptional situations. In principle, they allow 
Members to introduce, reintroduce or maintain restrictions not covered by 
reservations to the Code, and, at the same time, exempt these restrictions from the 
principle of progressive liberalisation”
176. 
                                                 
174 Ibidem, p. 3. 
175  As pointed out “the OECD Capital Movements Code is the only multilateral instrument promoting 
liberalisation of the full range of international capital movements, other than the rules of the European Union 
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  74As reported by the OECD Investment Committee, surveys of participating 
countries’ policies “have revealed that most countries have one or more 
investment measures designed to safeguard national security. However, few 
presently have explicit policies regarding foreign government-controlled 
investors, such as SWFs”
177. As a result, participants in the OECD project on 
“Freedom of Investment, National Security and Strategic Industries” have recently 
agreed on a number of key policy principles (i.e. non-discrimination; transparency 
and predictability¸ regulatory proportionality and accountability) that should be 
followed when adopting and implementing legal and regulatory measures 
intended to address national security concerns that arise in the general context of 
foreign investments as well as in the specific context of investments from 
SWFs
178 (Box 2). 
 
Box 2 – Guidance for recipient countries’ policy measures designed to 
safeguard national security toward SWFs and other foreign 
investments 
 
(As agreed by participants in OECD Investment Committee’s project on Freedom of 
Investment, National Security and ‘Strategic Industries’ (2008) and by governments at the 
8th Roundtable on Freedom of Investment, under the auspices of the OECD Investment 
Committee - 8 October 2008) 
1) Non-discrimination  Governments should be guided by the principle of non-
discrimination. In general governments should rely on 
measures of general application which treat similarly situated 
investors in a similar fashion. Where such measures are 
deemed inadequate to protect national security, specific 
measures taken with respect to individual investments should 
be based on the specific circumstances of the individual 
investment which pose a risk to national security. 
2) Transparency and 
Predictability 
While it is in investors’ and governments’ interests to 
maintain confidentiality of sensitive information, regulatory 
objectives and practices should be made as transparent as 
possible so as to increase the predictability of outcomes. 
A) Codification and publication. Primary and subordinate 
laws should be codified and made available to the public in 
a convenient form (e.g. in a public register; on internet). In 
particular, evaluation criteria used in reviews should be 
made available to the public. 
B) Prior notification. Governments should take steps to 
notify interested parties about plans to change investment 
policies. 
                                                 
177  OECD Investment Committee, (2008), Report on “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country 
Policies”, 4 April 2008, p. 4. 
178 Ibidem. 
  75C) Consultation. Governments should seek the views of 
interested parties when they are considering changing in-
vestment policies. 
D) Procedural fairness and predictability. Strict time 
limits should be applied to review procedures for foreign in-
vestments. Commercially-sensitive information provided by 
the investor should be protected. Where possible, rules 
providing for approval of transactions if action is not taken 
to restrict or condition a transaction within a specified time 
frame should be considered. 
E) Disclosure of investment policy actions is the first step 
in ensuring accountability. Governments should ensure 
that they adequately disclose investment policy actions (e.g. 
through press releases, annual reports or reports to 
Parliament), while also protecting commercially-sensitive 
and classified information. 
3) Regulatory 
Proportionality 
Restrictions on investment, or conditions on transaction, 
should not be greater than needed to protect national 
security and they should be avoided when other existing 
measures are adequate and appropriate to address a national 
security concern. 
A) Essential security concerns are self-judging. OECD 
investment instruments recognize that each country has a 
right to determine what is necessary to protect its national 
security. This determination should be made using risk 
assessment techniques that are rigorous and that reflect the 
country’s circumstances, institutions and resources. The 
relationship between investment restrictions and the national 
security risks identified should be clear. 
B) Narrow focus. Investment restrictions should be 
narrowly focused on concerns related to national security. 
C) Appropriate expertise. Security-related investment 
measures should be designed so that they benefit from 
adequate national security expertise as well as expertise 
necessary to weigh the implications of actions with respect 
to the benefits of open investment policies and the impact of 
restrictions. 
D) Tailored responses. If used at all, restrictive investment 
measures should be tailored to the specific risks posed by 
specific investment proposals. This would include providing 
for policy measures (especially risk mitigation agreements) 
that address security concerns, but fall short of blocking 
investments. 
  76E) Last resort. Restrictive investment measures should be 
used, if at all, as a last resort when other policies (e.g. 
sectoral licensing, competition policy, financial market 
regulations) cannot be used to eliminate security-related 
concerns. 
4) Accountability  Procedures for internal government oversight, parliamentary 
oversight, judicial review, periodic regulatory impact 
assessments, and requirements that important decisions 
(including decisions to block an investment) should be taken at 
high government levels should be considered to ensure 
accountability of the implementing authorities. 
A) Accountability to citizens. Authorities responsible for 
restrictive investment policy measures should be accountable 
to the citizens on whose behalf these measures are taken. 
Countries use a mix of political and judicial oversight 
mechanisms to preserve the neutrality and objectivity of the 
investment review process while also ensuring its political 
accountability. Measures to enhance the accountability of 
implementing authorities to Parliament should be considered 
(e.g. Parliamentary committee monitoring of policy 
implementation and answers or reports to Parliament that also 
protect sensitive commercial or security-related information). 
B) International accountability mechanisms. All countries 
share a collective interest in maintaining international 
investment policies that are open, legitimate and fair. Through 
various international standards, governments recognise this 
collective interest and agree to participate in related 
international accountability mechanisms (e.g. the OECD 
notification and peer review obligations in relation to 
restrictive investment policies). In particular, these help 
constrain domestic political pressures for restrictive and 
discriminatory policies. Recipient governments should 
participate in and support these mechanisms. 
C) Recourse for foreign investors.  The possibility for 
foreign investors to seek review of decisions to restrict foreign 
investments through administrative procedures or before 
judicial or administrative courts can enhance accountability. 
However, some national constitutions’ allocation of authority 
with respect to national security may place limits on the scope 
of authority of the courts. Moreover, judicial and 
administrative procedures can be costly and time-consuming 
for both recipient governments and investors, it is important to 
have mechanisms in place to ensure the effectiveness, integrity 
and objectivity of decisions so that recourse to such procedures 
is rare. The possibility of seeking redress should not hinder the 
executive branch in fulfilling its responsibility to protect 
national security. 
  77D) The ultimate authority for important decisions (e.g. 
to block foreign investments) should reside at a high 
political level. Such decisions require high-level involvement 
because they may restrict the free expression of property rights, 
a critical underpinning of market economies, and because they 
often require co-ordination among numerous government 
functions. The final decision to prohibit (or block) an 
investment should be taken at the level of heads of state or 
ministers. 
E) Effective public sector management. Broader public 
sector management systems help ensure that the political level 
officials and civil servants responsible for security-related 
investment policies face appropriate incentives and controls for 
ensuring that they exercise due care in carrying out their 
responsibilities and are free from corruption, undue influence 
and conflict of interest. 
Source: OECD Investment Committee, (2008), Report on “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country 
Policies”, 4 April 2008; OECD, (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Countries - Working 
together to maintain and expand freedom of investment, Message by the OECD Secretary-General to the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee, 11 October 2008, Washington. 
 
As a result, although the final report of the OECD “Freedom of 
Investment” Project (also covering SWFs investments) is not expected to be 
released until Spring 2009, the principles and guidance so far 
supported/developed by the OECD appear to already lay down a comprehensive, 
cooperative and sound approach to the concerns and issues raised by SWFs 
investments and provide important yardsticks for national investment policies. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that “principles are still too vague to constitute a 
proper framework for SWF investment. For example, proportionality and 
accountability need to be more clearly defined for the SWFs to be satisfied”
179. In 
particular, “for the SWFs to be satisfied, the OECD should make bigger efforts to 
involve them in the deliberations about the final report. […] And it needs to be 
prepared to give SWF countries a role in ascertaining whether recipient countries 
stick to the principles that they have signed up to (just like the recipient countries 
want a role in monitoring SWF compliance with new principles on transparency 
and accountability)”
180 provided for in the “Santiago Principles”. 
As to the latter remark, it is evident that, unlike the “Santiago Principles” 
approved and endorsed on a mere voluntary basis by (however authoritative and 
influential) IWG members, the OECD investment instruments on foreign 
                                                 
179 Barysch K., Tilford S. and Whyte P., (2008), State, money and rules: An EU policy for sovereign 
investments, Centre for European reform essay, December 2008, p. 15. 
180 Ibidem, p. 16. 
  78investments and Codes constitute “legally binding rules” of behaviour for the 
governments of OECD member countries and countries signing up to them
181. 
Even though OECD principles and commitments cannot be “legally” 
enforced through court decisions or other statutory enforcement actions and 
although “the Codes’ procedures do not provide for coercion or applying of 
leverage”
182 (thus “effectively leaving political application to national 
governments, so that the degrees of commitment and the ways of implementation 
and enforcement are likely to vary”
183), adherence is promoted (and achieved) by 
the “peer pressure” exercised through the provided processes of “peer monitoring” 
and “peer review” of adhering government’s observance
184. In this respect, the 
OECD “Freedom of Investment” Project – launched in 2006 to support 
governments in their efforts to preserve and expand an open international 
investment environment while safeguarding the essential security interests of their 
countries – has further “strengthened peer monitoring of country developments. 
This includes country notifications and deadlines for responding to Secretariat 
enquiries, roundtable question & answer sessions, and published accounts of the 
discussions”
185. 
That said, a concluding remark is now required. As mentioned, the pace of 
globalisation and the related growing economic importance of international trade 
and foreign investment flows (resulting in persistent global imbalances fuelling 
also SWFs increase in size and number) bring about significant ties and 
interdependence between countries, all over the world, more likely to promote 
commitment and compliance to responsible policies and cooperative economic 
behaviour by national governments than to result in disruption of the international 
legal and economic order. 
 
                                                 
181 However, as clarified, they are “not a treaty or international agreement in the sense of international law”, 
such as for instance the WTO agreements” (e.g. the General Agreement on Trade in Services), OECD, 
(2008), Codes of Liberalisation: user's guide, p. 8. 
182 Ibidem, p. 10. 
183 Kern S., (2008b), Control mechanisms for sovereign wealth funds in selected countries, CESifo DICE 
Report, No 4/2008, p. 46. 
184 In particular, as specified, “the OECD Investment Committee is the structure where member countries 
meet to discuss application and implementation of the Codes. The European Commission is represented. 
Other representatives, including from non-member countries, may be invited; the IMF, WB, WTO, UNCTAD 
and EFTA are also observers. […] The Committee conducts peer reviews of each country’s position under the 
Capital Movements Code […]. Horizontal peer reviews are another instrument under the Current Invisibles 
Code which look at a specific sector only but cover all countries. […] The Committee usually adopts written 
reports on each of these reviews which are submitted to the OECD Council. These reports are often 
accompanied by draft recommendations to the country or countries concerned, or by draft decisions to modify 
the reservation lists. Final decision on these lies with the OECD Council”, OECD, (2008), Codes of 
Liberalisation: user's guide, p. 13  
185 OECD, (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Countries - Working together to maintain and 
expand freedom of investment, Message by the OECD Secretary-General to the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee, 11 October 2008, Washington, p. 6. 
  7912. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper argues that the sharp increase in SWFs size and number stands 
for one of the by-products of large and persistent global imbalances – imbalances 
possibly threatening global financial and economic stability – and that the 
increasing transfer of “excess reserves” from Central Banks and Monetary 
Authorities to SWFs is expected to result in a significant rebalancing of capital 
flows in the global financial markets. 
The research shows that SWFs have provided significant benefits to global 
capital markets (e.g. via liquidity increase, more efficient risks diversification and 
resources allocation). Nevertheless, significant (to some extent unjustified) 
concerns have also been expressed as to: i) SWFs limited disclosure and 
transparency;  ii) SWFs multiple investment objectives; and, notably iii) being 
sovereign entities’ instruments (mainly established by oil producing countries and 
fast-growing Asian economies), as SWFs may be managed and utilised to pursue 
not only “genuine” economic and financial objectives but, rather, political and/or 
strategic objectives or in a fashion entailing national security concerns for the 
countries where SWFs financial resources are invested. 
That said, the factors underlying SWFs gain in prominence – making them 
emerge as among the most important institutional investors in global financial 
markets – and the legal and economic issues and concerns raised – not only in the 
recipient countries – by the cross-border activities of such state-owned investment 
vehicles appear to require multilateral and multi-layered regulatory approach and 
response. Indeed, the pace of globalisation and the related growing economic 
importance of international trade and foreign investment flows have created 
strong ties and interdependence between countries’ policies and economies, which 
would provide neither effective nor efficient unilateral policy response to SWFs 
issues. Moreover, recent developments in regulation of international financial 
markets show that “hard law” is not necessarily the best and most effective “tool” 
to influence and shape market participants’ incentives. As a matter of fact, “soft 
law” instruments and a “light” regulatory approach may turn out to be the most 
appropriate and/or “first-best” solution to attain specific policy objectives.  
With specific reference to SWF cross border investments, two elements do 
stand out – namely, i) SWFs sponsor countries’ interest in secure and liberal 
access to foreign markets; and ii) recipient countries’ interest in protecting their 
legitimate national interest towards foreign investments (notably by foreign 
sovereign entities) without hindering the increasing liberalisation of trade and 
capital flows and without stepping back from the international commitment to 
open investment regime for foreign capital.  
Aiming to attain balance between such diverse interests, a flexible, light, 
indirect and multilateral regulatory framework (based on both “hard” and “soft 
law” instruments) promoting and facilitating an open “bargaining” process 
  80between main stakeholders (e.g. through the IMF, IWG and OECD) turns out to 
be most appropriate and effective, at least for the time being. 
Indeed, such approach would successfully address the primary concerns 
raised by SWFs while ensuring compliance with the fundamental national, EU 
and international principles (e.g. fairness, legality, proportionality, 
reasonableness, transparency and accountability) with which any regulatory 
scheme addressing SWFs should adhere, also in order not to “discourage” the free 
flow of (sometimes essential) foreign investments and not to curb associated 
benefits. 
Accordingly, the proportionate and coherent common EU approach to 
SWFs investments formally endorsed in 2008 by the European Commission in 
response to emerging concerns (also among EU Member States) is broadly 
shareable and further implementation would thus be advisable. While aiming to 
provide a European contribution to the global effort towards adequate measures to 
increase transparency, predictability, responsibility and accountability of SWF 
operations, the EU approach suggested that (in the mutual interest of all recipient 
countries and SWFs sponsor countries) openness to capital investments should be 
primarily sustained by engaging SWFs and other stakeholders in the development 
of multilateral and cooperative instruments (e.g. “soft law” codes of conduct and 
effective cooperative behaviours) aiming to enhance SWF governance and 
transparency standards. 
In particular, while reaffirming the EU commitment to an open investment 
regulatory environment for foreign capital (pursuant to the EC Treaty principles, 
the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs and EU international obligations), the 
European Commission, rather than calling for the adoption of new specific 
statutory and regulatory measures, expressed full support to the multilateral work 
expected to be carried out, on a voluntary basis, at international level among 
SWFs, recipient countries and other stakeholders in order to develop and 
implement a set of guidelines to build the necessary confidence in SWFs fair and 
transparent operation (e.g. the “Santiago Principles”) and in recipient countries’ 
commitment to keep their markets “open for business” towards foreign and SWF 
investments (e.g. the OECD “Freedom of Investment and National Security” 
Project). 
In this respect, it is worth noting that – at the moment – the adoption 
within the EU of new legislative or regulatory measures towards SWFs 
investments could be deemed not appropriate or necessary, also in light of the 
several legal instruments and provisions currently in force: i) prohibiting all 
restrictions “on the movement of capital and on payments between Member States 
and between Member States and third countries"; ii) allowing both EU institutions 
and Member States’ competent authorities to properly tackle public security 
issues, or threats to other legitimate national interests (e.g. competition and 
intellectual property), possibly associated with foreign investments, including 
SWFs investments.  
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In other words, it appears that gut reactions are to be avoided, as the 
current EU legal framework applicable to cross border investments already 
provides a useful frame of reference for the guidelines and voluntary codes of 
conduct urged for SWFs investments, which would also contribute to 
strengthening their effectiveness and facilitating the adoption of cooperative and 
constructive behaviours among national governments and other relevant 
stakeholders. 
It is of course too early to draw conclusions on whether the resulting 
regime of “self-regulation within a statutory framework” would deliver the 
expected policy outcomes. Nevertheless, while patiently testing the effectiveness 
of the mentioned “soft law” instruments – without rushing into new (burdensome) 
regulatory measures – the expected progressive unwinding of global imbalances 
would probably lead to a decrease in both size and number of SWFs and thus 
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Picture 1 – Inception Year and AUM of Selected SWFs 
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Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority  875 UAE  1976  Commodity  25.3%  673.1%
Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation  330 Singapore  1981  Non-comm  9.6%  205.0%
Government Pension Fund of 
Norway  301 Norway    1990  Commodity  8.7%  78.8%
 Saudi Arabia – various 
holdings  300 
Saudi 
Arabia   n/a Commodity  8.7%  78.5%
Kuwait Investment Authority  265  Kuwait   1953  Commodity  7.7%  259.8%
Stabilisation Fund (and 
National Welfare Fund)  225  Russia   2004  Commodity  6.5%  17.5%
China Investment Corporation  200  China   2007 Non-comm  5.8%  6.1%
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Invest. Portfolio  173 China    1998  Non-comm  5.0%  83.2%
Temasek Holdings  134  Singapore  1974  Non-comm  3.9%  83.3%
Investment Corporation of 
Dubai  82 UAE  2006  Commodity  2.4%  63.1%
Qatar Investment Authority  60  Qatar   2005  Commodity  1.7%  142.8%
Libyan Arab Foreign 
Investment Company  50  Libya   1981  Commodity  1.4%  86.2%
Revenue Regulation Fund  47  Algeria   2000  Commodity  1.4%  34.9%
Australian Future Fund  44  Australia   2004  Non-comm  1.3%  5.3%
Kazakhstan National Fund  38  Kazakhstan 2000 Commodity  1.1%  36.6%
National Pensions Reserve 
Fund  31 Ireland    2001  Non-comm  0.9%  12.2%
Brunei Investment Agency  30  Brunei   1983  Commodity  0.9%  250.0%
Korea Investment Corporation  30  Korea, Rep. 2005  Non-comm  0.9%  3.1%
Alaska Permanent Fund  29  US  1976  Commodity  0.8%  70.8%
Khazanah National  26  Malaysia   1993  Non-comm  0.8%  14.4%
Alberta's Heritage Fund  16  Canada   1976  Commodity  0.5%  1.2%
Others  168  *** *** ***  4.9%  *** 
TOTAL  3454         
Source: IFSL, (2008 and 2009), Sovereign Wealth Funds 2008 and 2009; Standard Chartered, 
(2007), State Capitalism: The rise of sovereign wealth funds; World Bank, (2008), World Development 
Indicators database, World Bank, September 2008. 
 
 


































(Source: Standard Chartered, State Capitalism: The rise of sovereign wealth funds, 2007; World 
Development Indicators database, World Bank, September 2008) 
 
SWFs Use of Leverage 
 
(Source: IWG Secretariat in collaboration with the Members of the IWG, Sovereign  
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Projected FX Reserves (by 2013)
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(Source: Citi, (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds: a growing global force; IFSL, (2008), Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, August 2008; International Monetary Fund, (2008), Financial Stress, 
Downturns, and Recoveries, World Economic Outlook, October 2008; World Bank, (2008), World 




(Source: European Central Bank, (2008), The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial 
Markets, by R. Beck and M. Fidora, Occasional Paper, n. 91/2008) 
 
 




















































(Source: European Central Bank, (2008), The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial 






Official Foreign Exchange Reserves 
End-2008  USD bn  % share % change 
     2007 
China 2,243  30  43 
Japan 1,031  14  11 
Russia 387  5  17 
India 248  3  3 
South Korea  201  3  --- 
Brazil 201  3  9 
Hong Kong  183  2  25 
Singapore 166  2  106 
Algeria 138  2   
Germany 133  2  15 
Others 2,469  33  20 
Total  7,400  100   
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SWFs AUM Official FX Reserves 
Chart 8 
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(Source: IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2009) 
 
 




(Source: Lehman Brothers, Sovereign Wealth Funds an EU Perspective, 2008; International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008, Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries, World Economic 
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AUM 2006-2012, USD Trillion 






















































Expected New SWFs 
Sponsor 
Country  USD bn AUM  Wealth 
Source   Status 
Bolivia n.a.  Commodity  Planned 
Brazil 8  Commodity  Planned 
Canada n.a.  Commodity  Discussed 
India 5  Non  Comm  Discussed 
Japan 10  Non  Comm  Planned 
Nigeria n.a  Commodities Planned 
Taiwan 62  Non  Comm  Planned 
Thailand 10  Non  Comm  Discussed 
TOTAL  3300    
Source: Steffen Kern (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an 
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Chart 12 
(Source: IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2008 and 2009) 
 
Table 4 
Major SWFs Equity Investments in Financial Institutions since May 2007 
Date  SWF  Portfolio Company  $bn 
% 
Stake  Security type
May 2007  China Inv. Corp.  The Blackstone Group  3.0 9.9 
Non-voting 
common units 
Dec 2007  GIC  UBS  9.8 8.6  New Conv. Units 
2007- 
2008Q1 
Saudi Arabia Mon. 
Agency  UBS 
1.8 1.6  New Conv. Units 
2007- 
2008Q1 
Undisclosed Middle East 
Investor  UBS 
1.8 1.6  n.a. 
Dec 2007  China Inv. Corp.  Morgan Stanley  5.5 9.9 
Trust Preferred 
Securities 















Jan 2008  Kuwait Inv. Auth.  CITI  3.0 1.6  New Conv. Units 







(Dec 2007) - 




  982007- 








2008Q1  Temasek Barclays  PLC 




Bank  Barclays PLC 
3.0 3.1  Common Stock 
2007- 
2008Q4  Qatar Inv. Auth.  Barclays PLC 
3.5 8.9  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q4  Qatar Inv. Auth.  Credit Suisse  0.6 1.0  Common Stock 
2007- 
2008Q1 
Investment Corp. of 
Dubai  London Stock Exchange 




Authority.  London Stock Exchange 
2.0 20.0  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q1  Temasek Standard  Chartered 
8.0 18.0  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q4 
Investment Corp. of 
Dubai  Standard Chartered 




of Dubai  ICICI Bank Ltd 
0.8 2.9  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q1  SAFE (China)  Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia  0.2 0.3  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q1  SAFE (China)  Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group  0.2 0.3  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q1  SAFE (China)  National Australia Bank 
0.2 0.3  n.a. 
2007- 
2008Q1  Abu Dhabi Inv. Council  Carlyle Group 
1.4 7.5  n.a. 
    Total  81.1      
Source: Bank of England, Sovereign wealth funds and global imbalances, Quarterly Bulletin, 2008 Q2, p. 199; Lehman Brothers, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds an EU Perspective, 2008; Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute; Press Release (updated: April 2008); Steffen Kern 
(2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank Research, October 22, 2008, p. 12; European Central 
Bank, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets, by R. Beck and M. Fidora, Occasional Paper, n. 91/2008, p. 
11; U.S. Government Accountability Office, (2008), SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS Publicly Available Data on Sizes and Investments 
for Some Funds Are Limited, Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-946, September 
2008, pp. 44-45. 
 
Table 5 
SWFs Shareholdings in Major Financial Institutions (end-October 2008) 
Portfolio Company  $bn  stake (%) 
Citigroup $22.0  12.7% 
Merrill Lynch  $12.2  23.0% 
UBS $11.5  12.0% 
Morgan Stanley  $5.0  9.9% 
Barclays $5.0  5.2% 
Canadian Imperial Bank $2.7  11.1% 
Bear Stearns  $1.0  6,0% 
Total  $59.4   
Source: IFSL, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2009. 
 










(Source: Citi, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing Global Force, 2008)
 
(Source: Citi, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing Global Force, 2008) 
 
Ten Largest SWFs Transactions 2007–2008 
 
 







































(Source: Steffen Kern (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank 
Research, October 22, 2008, p. 11) 
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(Source: Steffen Kern (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche 
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Chart 17 
Investments with SWFs Participation in the EU by 



















(Source: Steffen Kern (2008), SWFs and foreign investment policies – an update, Deutsche Bank 
Research, October 22, 2008, pp. 9-10). 
 
 















Investments with SWFs Participation in Asia by 
























(Source: European Central Bank, (2008), The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global 




(Source: IWG Secretariat in collaboration with the Members of the IWG, Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
Current Institutional and Operational Practices, September 15, 2008, p. 17) 
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